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PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL JUDGMENT AND
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING: DRAWING
LEGAL AND ETHICAL LINES AROUND CONFLICT
OF INTEREST
STEVEN R. SALBU*
ABSTRACT
Pharmaceutical manufacturers develop relationships with
healthcare providers for several purposes, including the marketing
and sale of their products. Professional associations give guidance
to physicians and companies for managing these relationships
ethically. Some practices permitted by these associations entail
conflicts of interest. This Article explores two of these practices: (i)
company funding of external educational seminars, conferences,
and continuing medical education; and (ii) company-hosted speaker
programs. The conflict of interest concerns raised by the former
practice are manageable, and the practice should continue to be
permitted subject to appropriate safeguards; however, the conflict
of interest concerns raised by the latter practice create an unacceptable ethical hazard that cannot be managed. Company-hosted speaker
programs should be prohibited.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the years, critics have questioned the relationship
between drug manufacturers and medical practitioners.1 Recently,
this relationship has faced a heightened level of scrutiny.2 A 2008
study concluded that pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. “spend
almost twice as much on promotion as they do on [research and
development].”3 The study stated that annual promotional expenditures in the U.S. might be as high as $57.5 billion.4 At the
same time, other sources suggest that the figure might be as low
as $27 billion5—still a formidable number.
Growing concern about marketing to practitioners has
been fueled in part by the opioid crisis.6 Opioid manufacturers
See Susan Heilbronner Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical “Freebies,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 209 (1991) (discussing
Congressional scrutiny, going back to 1990, of pharmaceutical company detailing practices).
2 See John R. Washlick & Sidney Summers Welch, Physician-Vendor Marketing and Financial Relationships Under Attack, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. 151,
153 (2008) (“The interaction between healthcare professionals and healthcare
product manufacturers has come under increasing scrutiny.”).
3 Marc-Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New
Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5
PLOS MED. 29, 32 (Jan. 2008).
4 Id. at 31.
5 Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its
Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEW PRESCRIPTION PROJECT (Nov. 11,
2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11
/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-and-its-influ
ence-on-physicians-and-patients [https://perma.cc/Y55Z-MFBR] (citing CEGEDIM
STRATEGIC DATA, 2012 U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY PROMOTION SPENDING
(2013)) [hereinafter Pew Fact Sheet].
6 See, e.g., Jessica Bartlett, Opioid Marketing Contributed to Overdose Epidemic, Boston Medical Center Report Says, BOS. BUS. J. (Jan. 18, 2019, 11:11
AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2019/01/18/opioid-marketing
-contributed-to-overdose-epidemic.html [https://perma.cc/NZG5-5ZA3]; Andrew
Joseph, Purdue Cemented Ties with Universities and Hospitals to Expand Opioid
Sales, Documents Contend, STAT (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.statnews.com
/2019/01/16/purdue-pharma-cemented-ties-to-universities-hospitals/ [https://
perma.cc/KXV8-EH2B] (“Purdue ... saw the sponsorship of a pain program at
Mass. General as a way to gain sway at one of the most influential academic
medical centers in the country and boost its revenues—by encouraging doctors to
prescribe OxyContin and Purdue’s other opioids to more patients at higher
doses and for longer periods of time ....”).
1
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face litigation over their marketing practices, and the first major
settlement, with the state of Oklahoma, included an agreement by
one manufacturer to refrain from “visiting doctors to persuade them
to buy its products, until 2026.”7 In the spring of 2019, five executives from Insys were convicted for paying doctors to boost sales of
fentanyl, on the heels of earlier convictions of the company’s former
Chief Executive and former Vice President of Sales.8
As a part of its strategic emphasis on marketing, the modern
pharmaceutical industry exerts a strong influence on the prescription patterns of physicians.9 According to one recent commentary,
“[P]harmaceutical marketing can distort prescribing behaviors,
exposing patients to concomitant risks. Physicians tend to prescribe drugs more frequently and non-rationally in response to
pharmaceutical promotions.”10
This phenomenon is highlighted in Wazana’s review of
sixteen studies that provide some data on the impact of pharmaceutical gratuities to doctors.11 The data synthesis summary of
Wazana’s analysis states in part,
Physician interactions with pharmaceutical representatives
were generally endorsed, began in medical school, and continued at a rate of about 4 times per month. Meetings with
pharmaceutical representatives were associated with requests
by physicians for adding the drugs to the hospital formulary
Lenny Bernstein & Katie Zezima, Purdue Pharma, State of Oklahoma
Reach Settlement in Landmark Opioid Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019,
6:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/purdue
-pharma-state-of-oklahoma-reach-settlement-in-landmark-opioid-lawsuit/2019
/03/26/69aa5cda-4f11-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.1f121abb544f [https://perma.cc/X5B5-V72K].
8 Hannah Kuchler, Insys Founder Convicted in Opioid Bribery Case, FIN.
TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/f83fc974-6d09-11e9-80c7-60
ee53e6681d (last visited  Ǥ͵ͲǡʹͲʹͲ).
9 Sheryl Calabro, Note, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine: Placing the Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2254,
2254 n.65 (2004).
10 Recent Case, First Amendment—Commercial Speech—Second Circuit
Holds That Prohibiting Truthful Off-Label Promotion of FDA-Approved Drugs by
Pharmaceutical Representatives Violates First Amendment.—United States v.
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), 127 HARV. L. REV. 795, 802 (2013) (citations omitted).
11 Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift
Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 375 (2000).
7
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and changes in prescribing practice.... Attending presentations
given by pharmaceutical representative speakers was also associated with nonrational prescribing.12

These trends continue despite physicians’ recognition of the
associated risks.13 Wazana notes, “Most [residents and physicians in the studies] believe that representatives prioritize
product promotion above patients’ welfare and are likely to use
unethical practices.”14
In light of such concerns, are pharmaceutical company relationships with medical practitioners good or bad, or does it
vary according to the behaviors and the circumstances? There
are arguments to be made for and against the currently aggressive practices of pharmaceutical companies.15 These are explored
in this Article, which recommends maintaining some practices
and changing others.
The Article focuses specifically on the close transactional
relationships that develop between doctors and drug companies.16
Cozy connections among these two groups raise troubling conflict of
interest concerns.17 We would hope that moral peril created by
such conflict of interest among doctors in these situations is isolated and rare. If so, at least the overall social impact might be
contained, rather than pervasive.
Financial relationships between physicians and industry
are the rule, however, rather than the exception.18 A study by
Campbell et al. tallied the prevalence of “physician-industry relationships.”19 The research revealed that in both 2004 and
Id. at 373.
See, e.g., Nicole Van Groningen, Opinion, Big Pharma Gives Your Doctor
Gifts. Then Your Doctor Gives You Big Pharma’s Drugs., WASH. POST (June 13,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/big-pharma-gives-your-doctor
-gifts-then-your-doctor-gives-you-big-pharmas-drugs/2017/06/13/5bc0b550-50
45-11e7-b064-828ba60fbb98_story.html [https://perma.cc/KB8N-ZMWE].
14 Wazana, supra note 11, at 375 (citations omitted).
15 Id. at 373; see also Van Groningen, supra note 13.
16 See infra Part II.
17 See infra Part III.
18 Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician Professionalism and Changes in Physician-Industry Relationships from 2004 to 2009, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1820, 1820 (2010).
19 Id.
12
13
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2009, over 80% of doctors had one or more forms of financial relationship with drug or medical device companies.20
Although this figure decreased from 94% in 2004 to 84%
in 2009,21 this reduction reflects a more focused industry strategy for recruiting doctors as prescribers, rather than a curtailment of industry influence on prescription decisions.22 According
to Campbell, “The old approach was just to try to get as many
docs as you can, blanket coverage, and establish relationships ....
I think they’re being much more targeted and specific.”23
Vukadin has described the sophisticated methods used by
drug companies to target physicians for relationship-building
and the marketing of their products.24 The companies begin by
paying for data on physician prescribing habits and patterns.25
These data enable pharmaceutical representatives to understand physician behavior and identify who among physicians are
professional opinion leaders.26
Vukadin further observes, “The pharmaceutical industry
closely monitors all contacts with physicians. One service counts
the number of visits by pharmaceutical representatives and
ranks physicians based on their willingness to see pharmaceutical representatives: completely open, sometimes willing to see
pharmaceutical representatives, or completely unwilling.”27 Well
before business analytics initiatives ushered in the age of datadriven business and marketing practices,28 pharmaceutical companies were honing this approach.29
Charles Ornstein & Eric Sagara, How Much Are Drug Companies Paying Your Doctor?, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.scientificameri
can.com/article/how-much-are-drug-companies-paying-your-doctor/
[https://
perma.cc/VHP6-R97Q].
21 Id.
22 Campbell et al., supra note 18, at 1825.
23 Ornstein & Sagara, supra note 20.
24 Katherine T. Vukadin, Failure-to-Warn: Facing Up to the Real Impact of
Pharmaceutical Marketing on the Physician’s Decision to Prescribe, 50 TULSA
L. REV. 75, 79–83 (2014).
25 Id. at 79.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 79–80 (internal citation omitted).
28 For discussion of the trend toward using big data and analytics in making business decisions, see MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE AGE OF ANALYTICS:
COMPETING IN A DATA-DRIVEN WORLD 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.mckinsey
20
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In 2012, Cegedim studied how pharmaceutical companies
invest in marketing.30 They classified these as detailing (described
as “face-to-face promotional activities directed toward physicians
and pharmacy directors”), samples, educational and promotional
meetings, promotional mailings, journal and web advertisements,
direct-to-consumer advertising, continuing medical education, and
grants to health advocacy organizations.31 All but two of these
categories—direct-to-consumer advertising and grants to health
advocacy organizations—are aimed at medical and pharmaceutical practitioners.32
Historically, it makes sense that pharmaceutical marketing
has focused primarily on healthcare practitioners.33 Until recently,
direct-to-consumer (DTC) mass advertising was not practiced in
the United States.34 Traditional self-restraint among pharmaceutical firms reflected the “learned intermediary” doctrine, under which
access to drugs was—as it still in many ways is—moderated
through a gateway of trained healthcare professionals.35
.com/business-functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/the-age-of-analytics
-competing-in-a-data-driven-world [https://perma.cc/UQE4-B5B6].
Five years ago, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) released
Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, and
productivity. In the years since, data science has continued to
make rapid advances, particularly on the frontiers of machine
learning and deep learning. Organizations now have troves of
raw data combined with powerful and sophisticated analytics
tools to gain insights that can improve operational performance
and create new market opportunities. Most profoundly, their
decisions no longer have to be made in the dark or based on
gut instinct; they can be based on evidence, experiments, and
more accurate forecasts.
Id. at Preface.
29 Kalman Applbaum, Pharmaceutical Marketing and the Invention of the
Medical Consumer, 3 PLOS MED. 445, 445 (2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC1434507/pdf/pmed.0030189.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQR3-4BCW].
30 See Pew Fact Sheet, supra note 5.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Julie Donohue, A History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving Roles of
Consumers and Consumer Protection, 84 MILBANK Q. 659, 665, 669 (2006).
34 See id. at 674 (observing that no companies from the 1950s through the
early 1980s engaged in DTC mass marketing of pharmaceuticals).
35 According to the learned intermediary doctrine, “the physician is ‘best
situated to weigh the risks and benefits’ associated with a drug in relation to
the needs of the patient.” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab.
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As the FDA notes, DTC advertising was never prohibited
by federal law.36 Nonetheless, it was only in the 1980s that
pharmaceutical companies began DTC advertising in the U.S.37
Because, for many years, pharmaceutical companies promoted their
products solely to qualifying healthcare professionals, it isn’t surprising that marketing practices over most of the 20th century
developed primarily around physicians.38
What follows is an in-depth examination and assessment
of two pharmaceutical company marketing practices that target
physicians: company funding of and influence on the continuing
medical education (CME) seminars and conferences of third-party
professional organizations,39 and company hosting of their own
speaker programs.40 These practices are analyzed in terms of
conflict of interest concerns.41 The analysis suggests that some
current practices are beneficial and ethically manageable,42
whereas others provide insufficient social benefit while creating
unmanageable and therefore unacceptable moral perils.43 The
Article makes recommendations to address these issues.
Parts I and II explore the guidelines of the two key professional/industry groups on the relationship between drug companies
Litig., 286 F. Supp. 3d 667, 671 (2017) (quoting Fisher v. Pro. Compounding
Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1020 (D. Nev. 2004)).
36 Background on Drug Advertising, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Re
sourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm071964.htm [https://
perma.cc/AB8R-7CED] (last updated June 19, 2015).
37 Id. (“Until the mid-1980s, drug companies gave information about prescription drugs only to doctors and pharmacists. When these professionals
thought it appropriate, they gave that information to their patients. However,
during the 1980s, some drug companies started to give the general public more
direct access to this information through DTC ads.”).
38 Donohue, supra note 33, at 669.
39 See infra Section III.A.
40 See infra Section III.B.
41 For a broad background discussion of conflict of interest in the medical
profession, see generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (Bernard Lo &
Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009).
42 I refer here specifically to whether conflicts of interest can be justified
due to social benefits. See infra Section III.A. Some conflicts of interest are
avoidable or are acceptably manageable in order to achieve otherwise desirable ends.
43 See infra Section III.B.
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and medical practitioners. Specifically, Part I explores the American Medical Association (AMA) Code that governs physicians,
and Part II examines the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Code that governs the drug companies. Part III examines conflict of interest concerns raised by
the relationships between these two groups. The last Part provides
recommendations and concluding remarks.
I.THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS OPINION 9
The medical profession has addressed the relationship between doctors and drug companies through its umbrella professional organization, the American Medical Association (AMA).44
The AMA Code of Medical Ethics (AMA Code) was originally
drafted in 1847 and has been amended haphazardly over the
course of 169 years.45 It was systematically revised only twice:
first half a century ago and then more recently in 2016.46
This Section looks at two relevant parts of the 2016 version
that is currently in effect: Opinion 9.6.247 and Opinion 9.2.7.48 This
Article refers periodically as well to an important Opinion from the
previous version of the AMA Code, which was called Opinion
8.061.49 As a reminder of the status of each Opinion discussed
herein, this Article refers to them throughout as “Current” to
denote the AMA Code presently in effect,50 and “Previous” to denote the AMA Code that was replaced by the 2016 revisions.51
44 See AMA’s Leadership in Medical Ethics Guides Teachers and Learners
in Medicine, AM. MED. ASS’N (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.ama-assn.org/de
livering-care/ethics/amas-leadership-medical-ethics-guides-teachers-and-learn
ers-medicine [https://perma.cc/GR55-HDN7].
45 See Code of Medical Ethics Modernized for First Time in 50 years, AM.
MED. ASS’N (June 14, 2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/about/publications-news
letters/code-medical-ethics-modernized-first-time-50-years [https://perma.cc
/37L2-UYZ3] [hereinafter Code Modernized].
46 Id.
47 Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 9.6.2 (2016).
48 Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 9.2.7 ( 2016).
49 See Opinion 8.061—Gift to Physicians from Industry, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N
J. MED. ETHICS 261 (2014), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2014/04/coet2
-1404.html [https://perma.cc/BDE4-65FZ] [hereinafter Opinion 8.061].
50 See generally Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics, Opinions 9 (2016).
51 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
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A. Current Opinion 9.6.2
Current Opinion 9.6.2 regarding gifts to physicians from
industry observes that “[r]elationships among physicians and
professional medical organizations and pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies help drive innovation in
patient care and contribute to the economic well-being of the
community to the ultimate benefit of patients and the public.”52
This reasonable statement improves on a more troubling
assertion that was in Previous Opinion 8.061, which extended
beyond relationships to actual gifts,53 and stated that “[m]any
gifts given to physicians by companies in the pharmaceutical,
device, and medical equipment industries serve an important
and socially beneficial function.”54 The validity of this assertion
was, on its face, suspect,55 so it’s good that the AMA replaced it
with more measured and accurate language.56 After all, what is
there that drug companies can give to doctors that they cannot
buy themselves, or get elsewhere, without taint of favor or indebtedness? One commentator describes the situation:
[P]atients are unaware of industry marketing practices that
create conflicts of interest for doctors. Drug companies sponsor and publish shoddy research and present it to doctors at
free educational programs, often hosted at fashionable resorts
with complimentary gourmet meals and rounds of golf. They
pay doctors to attend and to present the marketing programs.
They also pay doctors to prescribe their drugs under the guise
of “research” which is scientifically worthless. They shower doctors with gifts and free samples to encourage prescribing. The
strategy works. According to studies reported in the Journal
See Opinion 9.6.2, supra note 47.
See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
54 Id.
55 See id. The suspect part of this earlier version’s introductory assertion is
its questionable assumption that gifts are important and beneficial in maintaining what are otherwise useful relationships between industry and doctors.
See Elaine K. Howley, Do Drug Company Payments to Doctors Influence Which
Drugs They Prescribe?, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2018), https://health.usnews.com
/health-care/patient-advice/articles/2018-08-31/do-drug-company-payments-to
-doctors-influence-which-drugs-they-prescribe (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (explaining that the actual impact of gift-giving “is still an active area of research”).
56 See generally Code Modernized, supra note 45.
52
53
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of the American Medical Association, in response to drug
company promotions doctors prescribe drugs more frequently
and nonrationally.57

Previous Opinion 8.061 posited only one example of a “socially beneficial function” of gifts to practitioners: the fact that
“companies have long provided funds for educational seminars
and conferences.”58 Certainly, educational seminars and conferences
for physicians do have social value, assuming that the information
provided in the programs is both objective and accurate.59 However, Previous Opinion 8.061 provided only this single example,
probably because other types of gifts to physicians are difficult
to justify and support.60
Ceteris paribus, a broad range of high-quality seminars
and conferences for doctors, prescribing physician assistants (PAs),
and nurse practitioners, is a good thing.61 Multiple seminar offerings give medical professionals choices, increasing the chance they
will get knowledge and information that will improve patient care.62
More seminars and conferences may enhance attendance by
helping match educational offerings to practitioners’ calendars,
schedules, geographic areas, and specific subject matter needs.
Funding these events also is likely to increase attendance
simply by virtue of the personal economics that drives decisionmaking generally.63 As practitioners weigh a variety of ways to
Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose OffLabel Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 970 (2007).
58 Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
59 See Sundeep Mishra, Editorial, Do Medical Conferences Have a Role to
Play? Sharpen the Saw, 68 INDIAN HEART J. 111 (2016). Logic tells us that
this is a big and perhaps unjustified assumption, given the conflicts of interest discussed in detail later in this Article. See also infra Part III.
60 Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
61 See Mishra, supra note 59, at 111.
62 There is a relationship between provision of choices and engagement of
learners. See generally Frieda Parker et al., To Engage Students, Give Them
Meaningful Choices in the Classroom, 99 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 37 (2017).
63 See Jeffrey A. Tabas et al., Clinician Attitudes About Commercial Support of Continuing Medical Education, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 840,
840, 843 (2011) (survey found less than half were willing to pay increased
registration fees to decrease or eliminate commercial support. In addition, 77% of
physicians said the cost of registration is an important factor in their decision
about which accredited continuing medical education activity to select.).
57
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spend their time and money, financial support provided by anyone—including pharmaceutical companies—naturally makes
seminars and conferences more affordable and appealing to potential attendees.64
Industry funding of conferences and seminars does raise
conflict of interest concerns.65 While most readers will already be
familiar with the concept of conflict of interest as a legal and
ethical issue, it may be helpful to define conflict of interest. Lo
suggests that conflicts of interest exist under “circumstances that
create ‘a risk that professional judgment or actions regarding a
primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest.’”66 In regard to physicians, Thompson states that “[a] conflict
of interest is a set of conditions in which professional judgment
concerning a primary interest (such as a patient’s welfare or the
validity of research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain).”67
Primary interests are the socially sanctioned, intended,
desired goals of a drug company or a medical practitioner, and
Lo agrees with Thompson that the welfare of patients should
logically be a key primary interest of doctors.68 Lo offers a more
expansive list of doctors’ secondary interests, including “financial
gain, ... prestige, professional recognition, intellectual commitments to an idea or approach, and favors to friends, colleagues,
or relatives.”69
For pharmaceutical companies, financial gain is likely to be
either the primary interest or the logical main secondary interest.70 Whichever is the case, if financial gain or other self-serving
See id. at 840, 843.
See infra Part III.
66 Bernard Lo, The Future of Conflicts of Interest: A Call for Professional
Standards, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 441, 443 (2012) (internal quotation omitted).
67 Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1993).
68 Lo posits “the well-being of patients” as a primary interest of doctors.
See Lo, supra note 66, at 443; see also Thompson, supra note 67, at 573.
69 Lo, supra note 66, at 443.
70 Whether profit is the primary interest of pharmaceutical companies or a
secondary interest depends on one’s philosophy of what is the predominant
social responsibility of business. Milton Friedman’s classic stance is that the
“social responsibility of business ... [is] to increase its profits.” Milton Friedman,
The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
64
65
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benefits might undermine patient treatment decisions, we should
be concerned.71
B. Current Opinion 9.2.7
Current Opinion 9.2.7 addresses physicians’ financial relationships with industry in continuing medical education.72 It
begins, appropriately, by recognizing and stating the risk:
Financial or in-kind support from pharmaceutical, biotechnology or medical device companies that have a direct interest in
physicians’ recommendations creates conditions in which external interests could influence the availability and/or content
of continuing medical education (CME). Financial relationships between such sources and individual physicians who organize CME, teach in CME, or have other roles in continuing
professional education can carry similar potential to influence
CME in undesired ways.73

The Current Version then states that, when possible, CME
funding and staffing should come from independent sources that
do not have a financial relationship with either the industry or
the educational subject matter:
CME that is independent of funding or in-kind support from
sources that have financial interests in physicians’ recommendations promotes confidence in the independence and integrity of
professional education, as does CME in which organizers, teachers, and others involved in educating physicians do not have

36 (Sept. 13, 1970). This approach suggests that profit is the primary objective of
all business entities. See id. Conversely, applying a stakeholder model, “a variety of other interests [besides shareholder profit] are considered such as
employees, suppliers, environmental, social and other interests.” Joel Slawotsky,
The Virtues of Shareholder Value Driven Activism: Avoiding Governance Pitfalls,
12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 521, 521 (2016). The social interest of public health can
arguably lead us to conclude that, under a stakeholder model, patient safety
should be the primary interest of pharmaceutical companies, with profit coming in as secondary. See generally id.
71 David J. Rothman, Medical Professionalism—Focusing on the Real Issues,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1284, 1284 (2000) (mentioning overtreatment of patients, self-referral, and fee splitting).
72 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
73 Id.
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financial relationships with industry that could influence their
participation. When possible, CME should be provided without
such support or the participation of individuals who have financial interests in the educational subject matter.74

As this “when possible” language implies, the Current
Opinion 9.2.7 suggests that at times, CME cannot avoid financial conflicts of interest.75 It states, “In some circumstances,
support from industry or participation by individuals who have
financial interests in the subject matter may be needed to enable
access to appropriate, high-quality CME.”76 It then enumerates
a variety of steps that should be taken when financial conflicts
of interest cannot be avoided.77 These include disclosing any financial relationships that might influence educational activities,
the sources and nature of any commercial support and financial
relationships, and any steps taken to mitigate influence of financial relationships.78 In addition, the Current Opinion outlines a
variety of mechanisms that should be undertaken to protect the
independence of educational activities.79
Previous Opinion 8.061 has two simple instructions for
managing conflicts of interest when companies subsidize conferences and professional meetings.80 First, it attempted to manage
any conflict of interest of such funding by requiring that company
subsidies benefit practitioners only indirectly.81 Section 4 of Previous Opinion 8.061 thus stated:
Subsidies to underwrite the costs of continuing medical education
conferences or professional meetings can contribute to the improvement of patient care and therefore are permissible. Since
the giving of a subsidy directly to a physician by a company’s
representative may create a relationship that could influence the
use of the company’s products, any subsidy should be accepted
by the conference’s sponsor who in turn can use the money to

Id.
See id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
81 Id.
74
75
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reduce the conference’s registration fee. Payments to defray the
costs of a conference should not be accepted directly from the
company by the physicians attending the conference.82

Secondly, Previous Opinion 8.601 also required that pharmaceutical companies funding the conferences or lectures of various
medical organizations not directly influence the content.83 Item 7
stated, “when companies underwrite medical conferences or lectures other than their own, responsibility for and control over the
selection of content, faculty, educational methods, and materials
should belong to the organizers of the conferences or lectures.”84
Item 7 of the Previous Version thus recognized that industry control of content is problematic, and prohibited outright
any content control by company sponsors.85 It is important to
note that this restriction was limited to situations where companies are underwriting conferences and lectures “other than
their own.”86 As we shall see, this left the door open for companies to influence and skew content through the provision of their
own speaker programs aimed at invited groups of physicians, and
using handsomely paid practitioner-speakers as the presenters.87
While the revised AMA Code regrettably still does not include these two specific restrictions that were in the Previous
Version, the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Code of Ethics does replicate both of them in the standards it lays out for the drug companies.88 Unfortunately, this still leaves physicians free, under their
own code of ethics, to accept direct compensation for attending
CME events, or to turn a blind eye to improper industry influence
over CME content, in cases where a drug company might violate
their own industry’s code.89

Id.
Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See infra Section III.B.
88 Compare Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48, and supra text accompanying
notes 73–74, with Opinion 8.061, supra note 49, and infra text accompanying
notes 100–02.
89 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
82
83
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II. THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS
OF AMERICA CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
Just as the AMA has its Code of Ethics for doctors, so the
drug industry has established its own code to govern pharmaceutical marketing practices.90 While the AMA is concerned with
the ethics of medical practitioners,91 the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) addresses ethical issues
facing drug companies.92
The PhRMA first introduced what is now called its Code
on Interactions with Health Care Professionals (PhRMA Code) in
2002, under the name PhRMA Voluntary Code of Marketing
Practices.93 The PhRMA Code was revised effective January
2009,94 and again effective January 2020.95 Unsurprisingly, like the
AMA Code, the PhRMA Code takes the position that there are benefits to current pharmaceutical industry promotional practices.96
Specifically, the Preamble of the current PhRMA Code
notes, “Ethical relationships with health care professionals are
critical to our mission of helping patients by developing and marketing new medicines. An important part of achieving this mission
is ensuring that healthcare professionals have the latest, most accurate information available regarding prescription medicines,
90 PhRMA Voluntary Code of Marketing Practices, RELIAS MEDIA (Nov. 1,
2002), https://www.reliasmedia.com/articles/110376-phrma-voluntary-code-on
-marketing-practices [https://perma.cc/P3Q8-AQ86].
91 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
92 As of August 19, 2018, the PhRMA’s web page lists the organization’s
mission as follows: “Our mission is to conduct effective advocacy for public
policies that encourage the discovery of important, new medicines for patients by biopharmaceutical research companies. To accomplish this mission,
we are dedicated to achieving these goals in Washington, D.C. and across the
country.” Our Mission, PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. AM., https://www.phrma.org
/about/our-mission [https://perma.cc/DJ6M-BK5P].
93 PhRMA Voluntary Code of Marketing Practices, supra note 90.
94 PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH
CARE PROS. 3 (2009), https://www.acpe-accredit.org/pdf/Code%20on%20Interac
tions%20HC%20Professionals.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HND-CKRG].
95 PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH
CARE PROS. 3 (2020), https://www.phrma.org/-/media/Project/PhRMA/PhRMA
-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/A-C/Code-of-Interaction_FINAL21.pdf [https://perma.cc
/33LF-44CH] [hereinafter PHARMA 2020 CODE].
96 Id. at 2; see also Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
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which play an ever-increasing role in patient healthcare.”97 This initial statement focuses on drug companies’ role in education and
information provision to healthcare professionals.98
The Preamble then elaborates in a set of bullet points that
frame the industry’s relationship and educational role with healthcare professionals as “critical” to meeting four goals: to “inform
health care professionals about the benefits and risks of our
products to help advance appropriate patient use, provide scientific and educational information, support medical research and
education, and obtain feedback and advice about our products
through consultation with medical experts.”99
Section 4 of the PhRMA Code maintains the two important
restrictions that were contained in the previous version of the
AMA Code,100 but which are missing in the current version.101
Under the PhRMA Code, company support of CME conferences
and seminars is required to be indirect—i.e., to the conference
providers in order to reduce registration fees for all—rather
than directly paid to attendees; and companies are not permitted to select “content, faculty, educational methods, materials
and venue,” but must leave these selections up to the conference
organizers “in accordance with their guidelines.”102
Section 7 of the PhRMA Code covers pharmaceutical company speaker programs that ostensibly help serve the educational
role.103 It notes:
Company decisions regarding the selection or retention of health
care professionals as speakers should be made based on defined
criteria such as general medical expertise and reputation,
knowledge and experience regarding a particular therapeutic
area, and communication skills. Companies should continue
to ensure that speaking arrangements are neither inducements nor rewards for prescribing a particular medicine or
course of treatment.104

PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2.
Id.
99 Id.
100 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
101 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
102 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 6.
103 See id. at 9.
104 Id.
97
98
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While this is a nice general edict, it is a requirement that
eludes any kind of conceivable monitoring. We can never get into
the mind of a sales representative or manager to know whether
they select and retain speakers based on expertise and reputation.
Similarly, we can never know if speaking arrangements are being
used as inducements or rewards. Let’s not be naïve: sales managers
and representatives under pressure to meet goals will inevitably violate these rules, 105 and the violation is undetectable because we can
never know the state of mind of the person who selects the speakers.
Recall also that the Preamble to the PhRMA Code states
that the current relationship between drug companies and doctors is “critical.”106 Are gifts, gratuities, and benefits from industry to doctors also critical to accomplish important goals, or are
they achievable in other ways? If they can be achieved by other
means, should the goals noted in the Preamble107 be accomplished
through the touted industry-practitioner relationship, or through
alternative means?
Because the four PhRMA Code Preamble goals108 have
some redundancy, this Article consolidates them for assessment
purposes into three discrete categories: informing and educating
healthcare professionals, supporting medical research, and obtaining feedback about products from medical experts.109 The
following Subsections explore and evaluate each of these justifications for the relationship between companies and doctors.
A. Informing and Educating Healthcare Professionals as a
Rationale for Relationships with Physicians
Pharmaceutical company funded events can be educational, and the companies have knowledge and information
105 See, e.g., Radha Chitale, Pfizer Pays $2.3B, But Will It Change the Pharmaceutical Industry?, ABC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009, 6:31 PM), https://abcnews.go
.com/Health/PainManagement/pfizers-23-billion-settlement-change-practices
/story?id=8476391 [https://perma.cc/GTX8-7UZN] (“At Pfizer, I was expected
to increase profits at all costs ....”).
106 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 This consolidation combines “inform[ing] health care professionals about the
benefits and risks of our products to help advance appropriate patient use,” with
“provid[ing] scientific and educational information,” as it is difficult to distinguish
the crux of these two justifications. Id. They are both education functions. Id.
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about treatment of the conditions they research.110 Pharmaceutical company expenditures on research and development have
soared over the past few years, rising steadily from $48.6 billion in
2011 to $71.4 billion in 2017.111 This investment gives drug companies a wealth of information to impart to medical practitioners.112
Educating doctors about treatments is, of course, important.113 That said, are drug companies the entities we should
entrust with accurately and objectively achieving this educational function? Levy, from the National Pharmaceutical Council
Inc., supports the educational role of pharmaceutical marketing,
stating, “Pharmaceutical marketing is the last element of an information continuum, where research concepts are transformed
into practical therapeutic tools and where information is progressively layered and made more useful to the health care system.
Thus, transfer of information to physicians through marketing is
a crucial element of pharmaceutical innovation.”114 Arguably, in
the absence of drug marketing, “few physicians and patients would
become aware of a new drug, and, thus, few patients would obtain its benefits.”115
However, drug companies have a fundamental conflict of interest as they seek billions of dollars in potential profits.116 This
For discussion of roles of medical information in the pharmaceutical industry, see Sukhpreet & P. Tiwari, Role of Medicine Information in Pharmaceutical
Industry, 68 INDIAN J. PHARM. SCIS. 801, 802 (2006).
111 Matej Mikulic, Research and Development Expenditure of Total U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry from 1995 to 2018, STATISTA (Mar. 9, 2020), https://
www.statista.com/statistics/265085/research-and-development-expenditure-us
-pharmaceutical-industry/ [https://perma.cc/BJT2-L29P].
112 See Sukhpreet & Tiwari, supra note 110, at 801.
113 See id. at 802.
114 Richard Levy, The Role and Value of Pharmaceutical Marketing, 3
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 327, 327 (1994).
115 Richard A. Epstein, Overdose: How Excessive Government Regulation
Stifles Pharmaceutical Innovation, 297 JAMA 646, 646 (2007) (book review).
116 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY:
PROFITS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS (2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-40 [https://perma
.cc/UL9A-XBNF] [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (estimating that pharmaceutical
and biotechnology sales revenue increased from $534 billion to $775 billion
from 2006 to 2015 and that the largest 25 companies achieved annual average profit margins between 15 and 20 percent). Although pharmaceutical
companies have the knowledge and information to educate doctors, their motivation is fundamentally compromised. See Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The
110
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conflict justifies skepticism about an educational function of pharmaceutical marketing.117 Fortunately, in any business, some
players will have strong ethical principles.118 Unfortunately, others may gladly skew medical information, engage in deceptive
behavior, or otherwise cut corners in maintaining an objective
educational role, in order to grow sales and profits.119
The stakes are high when pharmaceutical companies are
tempted and permitted to place profit-seeking over ethics in their
purportedly educational practices.120 No example is more compelling than the present, pernicious opioid crisis.121 Sarpatwari et al.
Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 463, 472–73 (2017). The primary driver of these companies—like all
companies—is not education. It is profit. Id. Pharmaceutical company executives and scientists work for a business, and businesses have the charge of
making money. High R&D costs, combined with finite timeframes for patented products, put enormous financial pressure on drug companies to sell their
products. See GAO REPORT, supra note 116, at 4–5, 7. Profit orientation, aggressive sales expectations, and incentive structures encourage companies to
pass these substantial pressures on to employees. See Sarpatwari et al., supra
note 116, at 467.
117 For example, one study found pharmaceutical advertising to go beyond
awareness-raising, seeking to “persuade through presentation of research
findings.” David R. Gutknecht, Evidence-Based Advertising? A Survey of Four
Major Journals, 14 J. AM. BD. FAM. PRAC. 197, 199–200 (2001). The finding
suggested that “[d]escriptions of research in pharmaceutical advertisements
were brief and incomplete, and they inconsistently provided the basic design
and statistical information needed to judge the results reported.” Id. at 197.
118 See generally Melissa Horton, The Importance of Business Ethics,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 1, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040
815/why-are-business-ethics-important.asp [https://perma.cc/DL6X-TCL8] (discussing the incentives that players in business industries have to be ethical).
119 For an example discussing misleading information in drug marketing,
see Adrienne E. Faerber & David H. Kreling, Content Analysis of False and
Misleading Claims in Television Advertising for Prescription and Nonprescription Drugs, 29 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 110 (2013).
120 See Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 27, 2020),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://
perma.cc/B22N-9RTP].
121 The National Institute on Drug Abuse refers to the present situation as
an “opioid overdose crisis.” See id.
The misuse of and addiction to opioids—including prescription pain relievers, heroin, and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl—is a serious national crisis that affects public health as
well as social and economic welfare. The Centers for Disease
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list “fraudulent marketing” as one of four problems that have exacerbated the opioid epidemic.122 They note that “to boost profits,
pharmaceutical companies have often engaged in false or misleading marketing. Over the past twenty-five years, the industry
has paid $35.7 billion to settle claims of illegal marketing, including making false or misleading claims or failing to disclose
known risks.”123
Ho & Rovzar describe one company’s marketing of a prescription opioid: “Through aggressive advertising and marketing
efforts, the company conducted more than forty national conferences from 1996 through 2001, through which it endorsed liberal
prescription of opioids ....”124 They further note that in 2001, the
company’s sales representatives received average sales bonuses
of $71,500.125
Not all entities and actors will manage the conflict of interest with integrity and place ethics ahead of self-interest.126
Are there, then, better societal players to engage in the role of
education of healthcare providers than drug companies? Arguably,
academic scientists are better positioned to play this role.127 In
addition to pharmaceutical company scientists, government grantfunded scientists working at universities are the other main group
that do research on pharmaceutical products.128
Control and Prevention estimates that the total “economic burden” of prescription opioid misuse alone in the United States is
$78.5 billion a year, including the costs of healthcare, lost productivity, addiction treatment, and criminal justice involvement.
Id.
See Sarpatwari et al., supra note 116, at 480.
Id.
124 Jeremiah A. Ho & Alexander O. Rovzar, Preventing Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome Within the Opioid Epidemic: A Uniform Facilitative Policy, 54 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 423, 437 (2017).
125 Id.
126 For discussion of conflict of interest challenges, see Pilar N. Ossorio,
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Legal and Ethical Issues, 8 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 75 (2001).
127 See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create
Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 50 SURV.
ANESTHESIOLOGY 282, 282 (2006).
128 See INST. OF MED., F. ON DRUG DISCOVERY, DEV., AND TRANSLATION,
BREAKTHROUGH BUSINESS MODELS: DRUG DEVELOPMENT FOR RARE AND NEGLECTED DISEASES AND INDIVIDUALIZED THERAPIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 2
122
123
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Of course, academic scientists employed by universities are
also subject to both institutional pressures and conflicts of interest.129 As Taylor observes, “Conflicts of interest are ubiquitous
and inevitable in academic life, indeed, in all professional life. The
challenge for academic medicine is not to eradicate them, which
is fanciful and would be inimical to public policy goals, but to
recognize and manage them sensibly and effectively.”130
The most direct of these pressures can come from industry
itself when academic scientists receive either benefits from a company or direct industry funding for their research.131 In these situations, the potential conflict of interest is an attenuated version of
the conflict faced by company-employed scientists.132 The latter
group faces greater pressures because their stakes are higher—their
livelihood depends on the company’s willingness to continue their
employment.133 In other words, the job security of a scientist employed by a drug company logically exerts a greater pressure than a
single project funded by the company to a university, whose faculty’s base salaries are paid by the employing university.134
Academic scientists can, of course, be subjected to other
pressures as well.135 If a pharmaceutical company has been a
(2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50977/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK50977
.pdf [https://perma.cc/49XF-NHVF] (noting that drug development is a combined
effort of not only drug companies, but also government-funded organizations).
129 See Ossorio, supra note 126, at 75.
130 Patrick L. Taylor, Innovation Incentives or Corrupt Conflicts of Interest?
Moving Beyond Jekyll and Hyde in Regulating Biomedical Academic-Industry
Relationships, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 135, 142 (2013) (quoting
David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 284 JAMA 2234,
2234 (2000)).
131 See Paul M. Ridker & Jose Torres, Reported Outcomes in Major Cardiovascular Clinical Trials Funded by For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations:
2000–2005, 295 JAMA 2270, 2270 (2006) (reporting findings that “[clinical] trials
funded by for-profit organizations were more likely to report positive findings
than those funded by not-for-profit organizations”).
132 Sheldon Krimsky, Do Financial Conflicts of Interest Bias Research? An
Inquiry into the “Funding Effect” Hypothesis, 38 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES
566, 577 (2012).
133 Compare id., with Mildred K. Cho et al., Policies on Faculty Conflicts of
Interest at US Universities, 284 JAMA 2203 (2000).
134 Compare Krimsky, supra note 132, at 577, with Cho et al., supra note
133, at 284.
135 See Marjorie Valbrun, Letting the Donor Decide, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 8,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/08/professors-question
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donor to the university that employs a scientist, administrators
who consider that funding relationship important might exert
pressures on the scientist to support the relationship.136 If this
becomes inappropriate pressure to report company-friendly results, scientists at universities may be subject to influences other
than pristine research methodology.137
We hope that core values of the academy—objectivity and
the quest for truth138—are powerful drivers of disinterested research. Given that a fundamental goal of academic research is the
quest for a true, objective understanding of the world, university
researchers are well-positioned to provide practitioners with reliable information.139
Pressures on research faculty to report donor companyfriendly results are nonetheless concerning.140 Theoretically, any
support from industry to universities—either general support or
support of research—should have no strings.141 Yet to assume that
this ideal consistently reflects reality is naïve.142 Indeed, there is an
axiom among university development professionals that there is no
such thing as corporate philanthropy—when companies give,
they expect to get some direct or indirect benefit in return.143
-big-donation-saint-louis-university-because-conditions-attached [https://perma
.cc/PL2Q-LD3T].
136 Maintaining research independence and integrity in the face of donor
pressures is a compelling and thorny problem. See id. (“Record $50 million gift to
Saint Louis University gave donors the right to help pick head of research
institute and give that person a faculty title. Professors see dangerous erosion of
academic values.”). While this kind of explicit quid pro quo agreement is likely
uncommon and considered inappropriate and unacceptable, universities may
naturally and unofficially defer to multimillion-dollar financial supporters to
curry favor and encourage ongoing support. See id.
137 See Krimsky, supra note 132, at 576.
138 See Michael J. Bolton & Gregory B. Stolcis, Ties That Do Not Bind: Musings
on the Specious Relevance of Academic Research, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 626,
627 (2003) (observing that “[a]cademics are trained to generate knowledge in
their respective disciplines”).
139 See Krimsky, supra note 132, at 567.
140 For an example of research initiatives guided by donor objectives, see
University Donations: No Strings Attached?, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPP. (Jan. 3.
2019), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/university-donations-no
-strings-attached [https://perma.cc/FX36-BJ5Z] [hereinafter University Donations].
141 For discussion of this issue, see generally id.
142 See Cho et al., supra note 133, at 2203.
143 Companies that support research or provide ostensibly philanthropic
support to a university often view these activities as investments. See Alaka
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Industry influence on academic research can be divided into
two scenarios. Scenario 1 exists when a company gives financial
support to a university in one guise, and a professor is doing research that is unrelated to that university support, but in which
the company has a stake.144 An example would be when a pharmaceutical company provides scholarship support for students,
while a professor in the Chemistry department is simultaneously
doing research that might affect the company.145
Scenario 1 can create pressure, albeit attenuated.146 If a
chemist gets called to the university president’s office to discuss
how her research results might influence continued scholarship
support, there is pressure—implicit, explicit, or both.147 This kind
of pressure can affect research objectivity, and therefore creates
ethical concerns.148 The pressure is attenuated, however, because
on their faces, the scholarship and the research are separate activities independent of one another, unless someone makes the
connection and exerts pressure based on that connection.149
Scenario 2 occurs where a pharmaceutical company is providing direct funding for a chemist’s research.150 If the company
Malwade Basu, Are Millennium Development Goals Relevant for Academic
Research?, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4235 (2007). Not surprisingly, given their
mission to make profits, they are seeking some kind of business advantage. See
Cho et al., supra note 133, at 2203. They may seek access to universities’ talent
pools for hiring or may be looking for relationships with faculty to reap the benefits
of their knowledge and expertise. See id. They may seek influence of some kind—
potentially including influence over research results. See Basu, supra, at 4235.
This last category of influence is the principle concern regarding whether
universities can be objective in research that is funded by industry. See id.
144 See University Donations, supra note 140.
145 See Valbrun, supra note 135.
146 See University Donations, supra note 140.
147 Basu notes that while research should not be politicized or improperly
influenced, the current reality is that it is:
The whole point of university affiliation is that the academic
can be an independent researcher whose research interests
and output are not dictated by university administrators, politicians or corporations. This is a mission that is already severely eroded by what has been called the corporatization of
the university and university research.
See Basu, supra note 143, at 4235.
148 See University Donations, supra note 140.
149 See id.
150 For discussion of the “funding effect” correlating funding sources with
study outcomes, see Krimsky, supra note 132, at 577.
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places any pressure on the chemist to report favorable outcomes,
that is unattenuated pressure since the company is directly attempting to influence the findings of research it is financially
supporting.151 Even if the company sponsoring research does not
overtly communicate any pressure in regard to research outcomes,
investigators might nonetheless infer or presume such pressure.152
Scenario 2 likely creates the greater moral jeopardy for
two reasons. First, in Scenario 1, we can and should hope that
the university president will exert her own professional ethics,
declining to intervene in any way that might influence the chemist’s results. At the very least, a savvy president will recognize
that such intervention creates an appearance of academic impropriety.153 Second, industry funding of faculty research under
Scenario 2 exerts a pressure that is immediate.154 It creates a direct
dependency on the part of the investigator that is potentially
powerfully corrupting.155
University research objectivity has been challenged as well
by those suggesting a liberal bias in the academy.156 While political
leanings do not necessarily imply political research bias, humans
See id.
See id. Faculty researchers are likely to be smart and savvy enough to
recognize that an industry sponsor has interests in the outcome of their research, and that faculty whose results are favorable to a company are more
likely to receive future funding than faculty whose conclusions are unfavorable to the company. See id. Even if a company places no express pressure on
faculty to arrive at desired conclusions, faculty can infer that there are potential stakes in the direction of their findings. See id.
153 See Basu, supra note 143, at 4235.
154 See Krimsky, supra note 132, at 577.
155 See Cho et al., supra note 133, at 2203–04.
There is a growing body of literature showing that faculty
who have industry ties are more likely to report research results that are favorable to a corporate sponsor, are more likely
to conduct research that is of lower quality, and are less likely
to disseminate their results to the scientific community.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
156 See, e.g., Robert Maranto & Matthew Woessner, Diversifying the Academy: How Conservative Academics Can Thrive in Liberal America, 45 PS: POL. SCI.
& POL. 469 (2012) (discussing the domination of higher education by politically liberal faculty and suggesting strategies for conservative faculty to avoid unnecessary conflict and thrive).
151
152

2020]

MEDICAL JUDGMENT AND MARKETING

49

are subject to unconscious bias generally,157 and concern has been
raised about possible political bias bleeding over into research.158
Recent data suggest that “[a]cademics, on average, lean to
the left.”159 In 2010–2011, survey results showed 62.7 percent of
full-time faculty at four-year colleges and universities identifying
as either far-left or liberal,160 while only 11.9 percent identified
as far-right or conservative.161
Ideological biases among the professoriate could affect research projects funded through grants.162 The peer review process in a liberally slanted academy may tend to favor both grant
proposals and refereed article submissions that appear to have
liberal leanings.163
If so, this can be a confounding influence on how well universities achieve the ideal of impartial, objective research.164 In
the arena of pharmaceutical research, political biases could be a
For a sampling of discussions of unconscious bias in a variety of contexts, see Philip E. Tetlock et al., Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias,
42 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (2013); Jean Moule, Understanding Unconscious Bias and Unintentional Racism, 90 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 320, 321 (2009); see also
Jeffrey Mervis, U.S. Study Shows Unconscious Gender Bias in Academic Science, 337 SCI. MAG. 1592 (2012).
158 See Robert J. MacCoun & Susannah Paletz, Citizens’ Perceptions of
Ideological Bias in Research on Public Policy Controversies, 30 POL. PSYCH. 43
(2009) (discussing ideological bias in research and finding that persons with
conservative beliefs tend to attribute studies with liberal findings to the researcher’s own political leaning).
159 Scott Jaschik, Moving Further to the Left, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 24,
2012), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/24/survey-finds-profes
sors-already-liberal-have-moved-further-left [https://perma.cc/AB3Y-WRNV].
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See Marc T. Law et al., Earmarked: The Political Economy of Agricultural
Research Appropriations, 30 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 194 (2008) (exploring political
influence over allocation of research funds); Carol J. Lee, Commensuration
Bias in Peer Review, 82 PHIL. SCI. 1272 (2015) (observing that reviewers’ systematic prioritization among various review criteria problematically influences publication and funding decisions).
163 See Maranto & Woessner, supra note 156, at 470.
164 For discussion of the risks of politicization of research and findings in
universities, see Hannah Forsyth, Disinterested Scholars or Interested Parties? The Public’s Investment in Self-Interested Universities, in THROUGH A
GLASS DARKLY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES LOOK AT THE NEOLIBERAL UNIVERSITY,
19 (Margaret Thornton ed., 2015).
157
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concern, as liberal and conservative positions may vary in regard to the value of particular drugs, medical interventions, and
policies around them.165
Despite the conflicts of interest that faculty face, universities are a better resource than companies for objectively educating and informing practitioners about drug treatments.166 There
is an inherent, fundamental difference between the mission of a
company and the mission of a university.167 Companies exist
primarily to make profits,168 whereas universities exist primarily
to create and disseminate knowledge.169
This could be true, for example, in regard to research concerning drugs
being explored as potential interventions to terminate pregnancy. For a discussion of the difficulty in establishing scientific objectivity in abortion-linked
breast cancer research and the political controversy surrounding the issue,
see Patricia Jasen, Breast Cancer and the Politics of Abortion in the United
States, 49 MED. HIST., 423, 423–44 (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC1251638/ [http://perma.cc/LYQ2-KSJX].
166 See Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 282.
167 See Margaret Thornton, Introduction: The Retreat from the Critical, in
THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES LOOK AT THE NEOLIBERAL
UNIVERSITY, 3 (Margaret Thornton ed., 2015).
168 This mission doesn’t necessarily imply a duty to maximize profits at
any cost. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005). Management has discretion under the
business judgment rule to consider tradeoffs between lawfully maximizing
corporate profits and serving the public interest. See id. (“Corporate managers
have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits. Rather,
they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest.”). The very discussion of whether corporate managers have any discretion ever to put public interest ahead of profits
highlights how central the profit mission is to company endeavors. The business judgment rule is the exception that proves the more overarching rule: the
primary role of companies is to make money. See id. at 736. Indeed, the case widely
viewed as a primary source of the business judgment rule itself asserts shareholder primacy, the notion that “[a] business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
169 In other words, the most central core value of a business is to sell its
products. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 684. In contrast, the core values of academic research are knowledge and truth. See Lisa D. Ordóñez et al., On Good
Scholarship, Goal Setting, and Scholars Gone Wild, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS.
82, 84 (2009). At least in their pristine forms, one is fundamentally partisan,
whereas the other is intended to be impartial. See id. at 84–85.
165
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Although people in any organization can be tempted toward unethical behavior, profit-seeking is likely to exert stronger
pressures than knowledge seeking.170 The sales goals of pharmaceutical company employees demand that they place their own
products in the best possible light.171 In contrast, the research goals
of scholars are, at least in their pristine form, manifestly aimed at
the pure and objective discovery of truth and knowledge.172 Moreover, tenure provides significant protection of academic freedom,
so that tenured university faculty are uniquely insulated from
pressures regarding their research, at least in terms of their basic
job security.173
For these reasons, information provided to doctors about
drug treatments is likely to be more objective when coming from
academic researchers than when coming from pharmaceutical
companies.174 This distinction forms part of the basis for the two
recommendations to come in the Conclusion: first, that drug
company sponsorship of external conferences does yield a net social benefit, and therefore should be permitted, provided appropriate safeguards are in place to deal with conflict of interest.175
Such conferences often feature university researchers as speakers,
and as we shall see, the conflict of interest in these situations
can be managed.176
Likewise, the lower susceptibility of academic investigators to industry influence relative to company-compensated investigators helps to justify the second recommendation to come
in the Conclusion: that companies’ own speaker series, featuring
See Ordóñez et al., supra note 169, at 86.
See Amanda L. Connors, Comment, Big Bad Pharma: An Ethical Analysis of Physician-Directed and Consumer-Directed Marketing Tactics, 73 ALB.
L. REV. 243 (2009).
172 Ordóñez et al., supra note 169, at 84–85 (defining good scholarship as
addressing important questions, generating knowledge, empirics, generating
implications, and being widely consumed).
173 See Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 328–29 (1990) (defining academic
tenure and discussing it as the main protector of academic freedom).
174 See Basu, supra note 143, at 4235.
175 See infra Recommendations and Conclusion.
176 See Marcia M. Boumil et al., Pharmaceutical Speakers’ Bureaus, Academic Freedom, and the Management of Promotional Speaking at Academic
Medical Centers, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 311 (2012).
170
171
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practitioners they compensate as the paid speakers, in balance
are likely to cause more social harm than benefit and should be
prohibited by the professional and industrial codes of ethics.177
One final concern does remain, though: is academic scholarship relevant to physicians’ treatment decisions? Is the basic
research that comprises much university scholarship178 even applicable to practitioners?
Traditional basic research is unlikely to be of direct use to
practitioners.179 A classic description of basic research is found
in a report from the National Science Foundation:
Basic research is performed without thought of practical ends.
It results in general knowledge and understanding of nature and
its laws. The general knowledge provides the means of answering
a large number of important practical problems, though it may
not give a complete specific answer to any one of them.180

Since basic research does not seek utility, much of it is unlikely
to be of great help to doctors when they are selecting the best
treatment for a patient.181
In the years since 1945, however, universities increasingly
are homes for applied research.182 Applied research has been described by the National Institutes of Health as including patientoriented research, epidemiologic and behavioral research, outcomes
research, and health services research.183 Applied research, as the
term suggests, focuses on how science can be used.184 Medical
See infra Recommendations and Conclusion.
For comprehensive discussion on the role and function of basic research
in universities, see generally Dpsirpe Schauz, What is Basic Research? Insights from Historical Semantics, 52 MINERVA 273, 274–75 (2014).
179 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION 38 (1953), https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/1953/annualreports
/ar_1953.pdf [https://perma.cc/75LB-PB8U].
180 Id.
181 See id.
182 Indeed, scientists at universities often are entrepreneurs operating businesses. See Melissa S. Anderson, The Complex Relations Between the Academy
and Industry, 72 J. HIGHER ED. 226, 230 (2001).
183 Doris McGartland Rubio et al., Defining Translational Research: Implications for Training, 85 ACAD. MED. 470 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC2829707/#R4 [https://perma.cc/QH8Y-957N].
184 See Charles S. Reichardt & Melvin M. Mark, Quasi-experimentation, in
THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 193 (Leonard
Bickman & Debra J. Rog eds., 2009) (observing that applied research “strives
177
178
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applied research has been divided into two somewhat murky
classifications: clinical research and translational research.185
Clinical research refers to medical experimentation with
human subjects.186 Clinical trials of drug products as required
by the FDA are done on pharmaceuticals being developed for
possible use.187 Translational research has been described to include “translating research into practice ... ensuring that new
treatments and research knowledge actually reach the patients,”
and enabling “clinicians and patients to change behaviors and
make more informed choices.”188
Whereas universities historically focused on basic research,189 scientific papers today often have commercial applications.190 This shift reflects the profitability of research, having
practical applications that can be monetized for both faculty and
to improve our understanding of a ‘problem,’ with the intent of contributing
to the solution of that problem.”). Of course, the bifurcation of research into
categories of basic and applied is in some ways an unrealistic construct, as
there is no clear delineation between the two. See Schauz, supra note 178, at
274–75. As Hammersley observes, harkening to Kurt Lewin, good theory itself is useful. Martyn Hammersley, Action Research: A Contradiction in Terms?,
30 OXFORD REV. ED. 165, 166 (2004).
185 For general discussion of these two categories of medical research, see
Rubio et al., supra note 183, at 470, 470–71.
186 See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 386 n.134
(2002) (quoting ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS 192 (4th ed. 1998))
(“Clinical research is defined as any clinical intervention involving human
subjects, patients or normal volunteers, performed in accord with a protocol
designed to yield generalizable scientific knowledge.”). For a very practical
and informative explanation by the FDA on clinical trials, see Learn About
Drug and Device Approvals, The Drug Development Process, Step 3: Clinical
Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development
-process/step-3-clinical-research [https://perma.cc/BCY9-AUEX].
187 See Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial
Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203,
222 (2011) (“In order to obtain FDA drug approval, the results of clinical trials must be reported to the FDA.”).
188 Steven H. Woolf, Commentary, The Meaning of Translational Research
and Why it Matters, 299 JAMA 211, 211 (2008).
189 See David Korn, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Academic Medicine:
Whence They Came, Where They Went, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 6 (2010–11)
(observing that an “enormous, world-leading American basic research enterprise” developed after World War II).
190 Daniel Benoliel, The Impact of Institutions on Patent Propensity Across
Countries, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 129, 144 (2015).
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universities.191 It likely also reflects growing pressures on universities to demonstrate economic impact,192 as well as a societal
shift to an increasingly entrepreneurial model of the university.193
Going back as far as 1992, Chew noted that 31% of university
research was applied or developmental,194 and suggested that
universities are becoming increasingly entrepreneurial.195 Notwithstanding the importance of basic research, practical applications
can provide more readily appreciated public optics regarding the
value universities create.196
Seventeen years after Chew’s article, Frischmann observed
that “[m]ost university science and technology research systems
serve mixed commercial, public, and social ends by enabling the
production of a wide variety of private, public, and nonmarket
goods.”197 Thus, the trend toward more applied research appears
to continue.198
See Philip G. Pardey et al., Creating, Protecting, and Using Crop Biotechnologies Worldwide in an Era of Intellectual Property, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 213, 225 (2004) (discussing dynamics that “could shift the emphasis of
university research from fundamental basic research toward more applied
research that is potentially more rewarding financially for the university or
its research faculty ....”).
192 See Chanphirun Sam & Peter van der Sijde, Understanding the Concept of
the Entrepreneurial University from the Perspective of Higher Education Models,
68 HIGHER ED. 891, 891 (2014) (“[C]hanges have been seen in the evolutionary
roles of universities, which share the common trend from traditional missions
of teaching and research to the third mission for economic development.”).
193 See Alice Lam, From ‘Ivory Tower Traditionalists’ to ‘Entrepreneurial
Scientists’?, 40 SOC. STUD. SCI. 307 (2010) (suggesting that an entrepreneurial
model of the university is transforming academic sciences in a way that
stresses “knowledge capitalization”).
194 Pat K. Chew, Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 259, 307.
195 Id. at 308.
196 Indeed, there are societal expectations that some form of practical return on investment will come from funding academic research. See Benjamin
F. Jones & Mohammad Ahmadpoor, Tracing the Links Between Basic Research
and Real-World Applications, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:01 PM),
http://theconversation.com/tracing-the-links-between-basic-research-and-real
-world-applications-82198 [https://perma.cc/BN34-AQJY] (“But what kind of
return are we as a society recouping on this large investment in new discoveries? Does scientific research reliably lead to usable practical advances?”).
197 Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143,
2154 (2009) (emphasis in original).
198 See id.
191

2020]

MEDICAL JUDGMENT AND MARKETING

55

Why is this trend relevant? The trend addresses the question, even if universities might be expected to be the most disinterested, objective sources of good drug treatment for physicians,
do university investigators do that kind of research? Increasingly,
the answer is yes, they often do.199
B. Supporting Medical Research as a Rationale for Relationships
with Physicians
The second function of interaction between drug companies and healthcare professionals that is posited in the PhRMA
Code is the support of medical research.200 Let’s start with an
axiom: research on pharmaceutical products to determine their
efficacy and safety is critically important.201 A second axiom is that
pharmaceutical companies have the interest, the resources, the
stakes, and indeed the legal obligation under current regulations to
engage in such testing as part of the drug approval process.202
This research role of the pharmaceutical industry certainly
does entail interaction with healthcare professionals.203 But what
should that interaction look like? Consider the range of interactions.
One is identification of medical experts to engage in research.204
Another is cooperation with those experts in the development of
research questions, projects, and protocols. In fact, drug companies accomplish these important tasks by hiring qualified researchers to perform the clinical trials required by law.205
See id.
See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2 and text accompanying
note 199.
201 Why is Pharmacology Research Important?, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Dec. 1,
2016), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pharma/conditioninfo/important
[https://perma.cc/B5FB-LMZM] (observing that pharmacology research serves
to determine both safety and effectiveness of medications).
202 See generally Development and Approval Process: Drugs, FDA (Oct. 28,
2019, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs [https://
perma.cc/32CH-UMVY].
203 See id.
204 See Alexander Schuhmacher et al., Changing R&D Models in ResearchBased Pharmaceutical Companies, 14 J. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 105, 110 (2016)
(observing that the pharmaceutical industry traditionally has relied on third
parties for specialized expertise).
205 Under the U.S. regulatory model, clinical trials are conducted and financed by pharmaceutical companies. See Jennifer S. Bard, What to do When
You Can’t Hear the Whistleblowing: A Proposal to Protect the Public’s Health
199
200
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In these ways, pharmaceutical research benefits from, and
indeed relies on, corporate interaction with medical professionals.206 But interaction and employment of medical staff are one
thing; subsidies, honoraria and perquisites to non-employee practitioners are another thing entirely.207 There is no rational link
that requires the latter to enable the former.208
If pharmaceutical research is to be objective, the relationship between companies and external researchers should be as
unsullied as possible.209 On this research purity dimension, the
marketing functions of drug companies cannot, in any reasonable
way, be justified as serving the “supporting medical research”
function.210 The two are simply unrelated: selling the company’s
product to doctors has no connection to researching products.211
If anything, these two functions are incompatible with one another: doctors who receive perquisites from a company are no
longer the disinterested, objective scientists best qualified to investigate and evaluate the company’s products.212
Given that companies do have the stakes and the resources
to sponsor research on their products, and in light of resource
scarcity and the inability of government to support all the research
by Providing Whistleblower Protection for Medical Researchers, 9 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“It is the fragmented way research and drug development is
structured in the United States which makes it so hard to protect the public. U.S.
law divides human subjects’ safety oversight into two separate jurisdictions:
first, research funded by agencies of the Federal Government and second, drug
trials paid for by pharmaceutical companies.”) (internal citations omitted).
206 See Schuhmacher et al., supra note 204, at 109.
207 See Bard, supra note 205, at 36.
208 See Cole Wayant et al., Research Letter, Financial Conflicts of Interest
Among Oncologist Authors of Reports of Clinical Trials, 4 JAMA ONCOLOGY
1426, 1427 (2018).
209 Sameer S. Chopra, Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?,
290 JAMA 113, 113 (2003) (“[S]cientists who design, conduct, analyze, and
report clinical trials often receive monetary compensation from drug companies, in the form of either salaries or consulting fees. These arrangements
raise several concerns.”).
210 Mace L. Rothenberg & David H. Johnson, Conflict of Interest, Conflicting Interests, and Effective Collaboration Between Academia and Industry on
Preclinical and Clinical Cancer Research, 3 JAMA ONCOLOGY 1621 (2017).
211 See Wayant et al., supra note 208, at 1427.
212 For discussion of the relationship between investigator conflict of interest and quality of scientific research, see id; see also Rothenberg & Johnson,
supra note 210, at 1621–22.
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needed,213 we do not have the luxury of disqualifying industry
funding as a source of scientific research sponsorship.214 However,
we can and should impose legal and ethical constraints on the
relationship and the funding.
These constraints ought to comprise three main categories: disqualification of research when, for whatever reason, an
investigator is subject to conflicts of interest that cannot be
managed;215 a requirement that researchers with manageable
conflicts of interest disclose the conflict;216 and a prohibition of
unnecessary, ancillary forms and sources of conflict of interest.
This last category is the relevant one to this discussion: there is
no benefit to anyone, apart from the pharmaceutical company
and the doctors who benefit, to providing perquisites directly to
physicians, beyond the funding of research itself.217
C. Obtaining Feedback About Products from Medical Experts as
a Rationale for Relationships with Physicians
The final function of the corporate relationship with doctors
noted in the PhRMA Code is the receipt by drug manufacturers
of feedback from practitioners regarding their products.218 While
213 See Joanne Waldstreicher & Michael E. Johns, Viewpoint, Managing
Conflicts of Interest in Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, 317 JAMA
1751, 1751 (2017) (“Companies engaged in health care research and development share, with health professionals, academic health centers, patient advocacy
organizations, and other medical and health-related institutions, the mission
to improve human health. Companies play indispensable roles in advancing
almost all aspects of this mission, including sponsoring clinical research and
generating clinical data that serve as the basis for drug and device approvals,
guidelines, and prescribing information.”).
214 See Bard, supra note 205, at 34.
215 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
216 An example of the disclosure approach is Japan’s Clinical Practice
Guidelines, under which pharmaceutical company payments to physicians
are disclosed. Hiroaki Saito et al., Evaluation of Pharmaceutical Company
Payments and Conflict of Interest Disclosures Among Oncology Clinical Practice
Guideline Authors in Japan, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Apr. 26, 2019), https://
jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2731682 [https://perma
.cc/28XD-DA99] (“In accordance with the Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association guidelines for transparency, pharmaceutical company payments
to physicians have been disclosed since 2013.”).
217 See infra Section II.C.2.
218 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95 and text accompanying note 99.
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the feedback function is important, it neither requires nor justifies giving company benefits directly to doctors.219 The following
subsections explore why the feedback loop from practitioners to
drug companies is so important, and why gifts and payments to
physicians for lecturing are unnecessary to the feedback loop.
1. Why the Feedback Loop from Practitioners to Drug
Companies Is Important
The FDA new drug approval process is inherently imperfect:
it is impossible to devise a drug approval system that evaluates
efficacy and safety with complete accuracy.220 Medical research
is subject to uncertainty and error.221 Moreover, if clinical trials
are to have any hope of giving us useful pharmaceuticals, approval processes need to be reasonably expedient,222 and of
course, there is a natural, unavoidable tension between expediency and thoroughness.223
Accordingly, FDA drug approval protocols balance the desire to approach research perfection with the need of patients for
promising and timely treatments, especially when the alternatives are limited and prognoses are poor.224 Moreover, long-term
See id.
See Nicholas S. Downing et al., Original Investigation, Postmarket
Safety Events Among Novel Therapeutics Approved by the US Food and Drug
Administration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854 (2017) (observing
that for 222 novel therapeutics during the time period studied, there were
123 postmarket safety events that led to withdrawals, boxed warnings, and
safety communications).
221 See id.
222 This need has led to expedited FDA review processes. See Thomas J.
Hwang et al., Research Letter, The FDA’s Expedited Programs and Clinical
Development Times for Novel Therapeutics, 2012–2016, 318 JAMA 2137
(2017) (discussing four expedited FDA programs: “(1) priority review leads to
FDA review in 6 months (vs 10 months for standard review); (2) accelerated
approval permits approval based on surrogate measures; and (3) fast-track
and (4) breakthrough therapy programs are intended to reduce the duration
of clinical trials.”).
223 Anupam B. Jena et al., The Trade-off Between Speed and Safety in Drug
Approvals, 3 JAMA ONCOLOGY 1465 (2017).
224 See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Four Ways to Address the Ethical Tensions Around Expedited Approval of New Prescription Drugs, HEALTH
AFFS. BLOG (June 23, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog
20160623.055507/full/ [https://perma.cc/9GJV-P6RE] (“Because testing new
219
220
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risks and harms take years to appear, therefore clinical trials
will not discover them prior to approval.225
The AIDS crisis in the 1980s illustrates the tension between rigorous thoroughness and the need to provide promising
treatments without undue delay.226 When effective treatments
did not yet exist, growing numbers of patients lacked the time to
wait for perfect research.227 Both the FDA and pharmaceutical
companies were faced with the challenge of balancing meticulous, time-consuming studies with the need for promising, yetto-be-proven options.228 Accordingly, fast-track approval processes
proliferated.229 However, whenever pre-marketing approvals are
expedited or abbreviated, the need for post-approval surveillance becomes increasingly important.230
drugs requires a delay between identification of an important, novel prescription drug and FDA approval, some patients with serious or life-threatening
illnesses and no satisfactory options will not live to see a potentially lifesaving medication approved for public use. To address this concern, the FDA
and Congress have established several programs—with the support of pharmaceutical manufacturers and some patient advocacy groups—that allow new
drug approval based on less evidence, so that patients and their physicians
have faster access and potentially a greater choice of therapies.”).
225 See Krishnan Vengadaraga Chary, Editorial, Expedited Drug Review
Process: Fast, but Flawed, 7 J. PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACOTHERAPEUTICS
57, 58 (2016) (discussing drug approvals that were later withdrawn due to
outcomes unpredicted in the original research that supported the approvals).
226 Jon Scott Batterman, Note, Brother Can You Spare a Drug: Should the
Experimental Drug Distribution Standards Be Modified in Response to the
Needs of Persons with AIDS?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 193–95 (1990).
227 See id. (“Based on the lack of FDA-approved drugs for the treatment of
AIDS, many persons suffering from the syndrome are desperately seeking access
to drugs which have been approved for experimental testing on humans, but
which have not satisfied the rigid safety and effectiveness testing criteria of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.”) (internal citations omitted).
228 See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS:
A Contractarian Model of Access, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 403 (1994) (observing the conflict that existed in the 1980s between rigorous scientific research
and the time-sensitive needs of patients seeking effective HIV and AIDS
treatment options).
229 Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Trends in Utilization of FDA Expedited Drug
Development and Approval Programs, 1987–2014: Cohort Study, 351 THE
BMJ 1 (2015) (“In the past two decades, drugs newly approved by the FDA
have been associated with an increasing number of expedited development or
review programs.”).
230 This need is especially important given concerns that fast-track processes may have been motivated not simply by concern for patients, but also
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Thus, FDA new drug approvals cannot be viewed as conclusive; rather, they aim to optimize the balance between approaching research perfection and the realities of error and a
need for reasonable speed in bringing promising pharmaceuticals
to market.231 Because new drug approvals are based on inconclusive determinations, mechanisms for post-approval monitoring and feedback are crucial.232
The PhRMA Code appropriately recognizes the experience
of prescribing physicians and their patients as essential to this
ongoing, post-approval assessment.233 The Code correctly posits
post-approval monitoring and feedback as a good reason for a
relationship to exist between pharmaceutical companies and
doctors.234 However, as we shall see in the next Subsection, this
relationship need not and should not entail some common but
ethically tainted practices and transactions.

as FDA payback to the powerful drug companies that underwrite much of the
FDA budget. See Caroline Chen, FDA Repays Industry by Rushing Risky
Drugs to Market, PROPUBLICA (June 26, 2018, 5 AM), https://www.propublica
.org/article/fda-repays-industry-by-rushing-risky-drugs-to-market
[https://
perma.cc/UK8A-4STH] (“As pharma companies underwrite three-fourths of the
FDA’s budget for scientific reviews, the agency is increasingly fast-tracking
expensive drugs with significant side effects and unproven health benefits.”).
231 See Fast Track, FDA (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast
-track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review/fast-track
[https://perma.cc/QWK9-YXRR] (stating fast track processing is meant to expedite review of drugs that meet two criteria: “treat[ing] serious conditions
and fill[ing] an unmet medical need.”). The breadth of these criteria for fast
track review highlights the importance the FDA places on speed in getting
promising drug treatments to patients in need.
232 See Paul Kubler, Fast-Tracking of New Drugs: Getting the Balance
Right, 41 AUSTL. PRESCRIBER 98, 99 (2018) (observing that “[a]ccess to new
therapies is a balance between evidence (determining the risk of acceptable
adverse effects versus efficacy) and the speed of availability, intersected by the
issue of affordability[,]” and therefore “[r]apidly approved drugs should receive
provisional registration for a period of three years and the drug company should be
required to provide annual data on the postmarketing experience.”).
233 PhRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS
BEHIND NEW MEDICINES 16 (2015) (stating “[r]esearch on a new medicine does
not end when the discovery and development phases are completed and the
medicine is available to patients.”).
234 See Opinion 9.6.2, supra note 47.
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2. Why Gifts and Payments by Drug Companies for Lecturing
Are Unnecessary to the Feedback Loop
Practitioner and patient feedback to drug manufacturers
neither requires nor benefits from various perquisites currently
provided to doctors.235 Relationships do not require emolument,
especially in areas where the public good demands professional
and commercial ethical commitments from associations like the
AMA, the PhRMA, and the constituencies they represent.236
An effective and appropriate mechanism already exists for
feedback from doctors to pharmaceutical companies: the FDA’s
adverse event reporting system.237 The agency’s MedWatch website is a vehicle for both physicians and patients “to voluntarily
report a serious adverse event, product quality problem, product
use/medication error, or therapeutic inequivalence/failure that
[they] suspect is associated with the use of an FDA-regulated
drug, biologic, medical device, dietary supplement or cosmetic.”238
Moreover, this voluntary reporting mechanism is not the only
vehicle for feedback on drug efficacy and safety.239 Rather, it enhances mandatory reporting by facilities, distributers, importers, applicants, and manufacturers.240
There is no justifiable connection between this important
feedback loop and gifts or payments from companies to doctors.241
See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 11 (suggesting items and
gifts provided to doctors should not be offered); see also Opinion 9.6.2, supra
note 47 (suggesting the risk of gifts causing bias on “professional judgment in
the care of patients.”).
236 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 11; Opinion 9.6.2, supra note 47.
237 See Reporting Serious Problems to the FDA, FDA (May 22, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/HowToReport/default.htm
[https://
perma.cc/6Q2C-J39H].
238 Id.
239 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING FOR OUTSOURCING FACILITIES UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 2, 9 (Oct. 2015).
240 Id. (referring to “postmarketing adverse experience reports required
under 21 CFR 310.305, 314.80, 314.98, and 600.80 ... 760 of the FD&C Act ...
and [u]nder section 503B ....”) (internal citations omitted).
241 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 11 (suggesting certain items
should not be offered to health care professionals); see also Opinion 9.6.2, supra
note 47 (stating “[g]ifts to physicians from industry create conditions that carry
235
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The argument might be made that paid physician speaker programs enhance feedback about products because they provide a
venue where pharmaceutical representatives and doctors meet,
mingle, and interact, and that such opportunities might increase
the chance that drug companies will learn about the clinical experiences of the doctors who prescribe their products.242 Anything that increases interactions between manufacturers and
prescribers also increases communication generally, and ideally
also specifically around product strengths and weaknesses.243
However, serious conflict of interest problems to be discussed in the following Section outweigh any dubious and tenuous value of paid speaker programs as events supporting the
feedback loop.244 Physicians are highly trained professionals
from whom we rightly expect the highest level of commitment
and rectitude.245 If we do not adequately do so already, we should
train them to report all adverse clinical experiences to manufacturers, without the need for artificially constructed interaction
opportunities that are grounded in ethically troubling payments,
and we should both expect and professionally require that they
do so. While feedback to drug companies does justify their relationship with physicians, it cannot justify transactions that are
tainted by unacceptable conflicts that can compromise optimal
patient treatment decisions.246
the risk of subtly biasing—or being perceived to bias—professional judgment
in the care of patients.”).
242 See Manasa Shankar, Are Promotional Speaker Programs Going the
Distance?, BEROE (July 30, 2019), https://www.beroeinc.com/whitepaper/are
-promotional-speaker-programs-going-the-distance/ [https://perma.cc/UZ72-WT23]
(suggesting the importance of speaker programs and how they “help physicians
stay up-to-date on information about new medicines, new uses of medicines,
the latest clinical data, appropriate dosing, and emerging safety issues.”).
243 See id. (stating that speaker programs “help professionals stay up-todate on the latest developments in the industry.”).
244 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 41, at 166–67.
245 Along these lines, Mehlman suggests that doctors have a fiduciary role.
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2, 15, 57, 63 (2015).
246 Johns, supra note 57, at 968–70 (describing the present issues of off-label
prescriptions and how conflicts of interest arising from drug sponsorships can
hurt optimal patient treatment).
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III.EXAMINING THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN DRUG COMPANIES AND DOCTORS
As noted in Part I, the previous version of the AMA Code,
prior to the 2016 revision, provided one, but only one, example of
a benefit of gifts to practitioners: the provision of educational
seminars and conferences.247 It makes sense that the drafters
chose it, because it is the sole plausible justification of pharmaceutical industry gratuities provided to medical and pharmaceutical practitioners.248 Yet even this strongest case example has
flaws, all related to conflicts of interest or both pharmaceutical
companies and medical practitioners under current practices.249
This Section explores two of the most prevalent and potentially concerning of these conflicts. Subsection A below discusses the nature of the conflict of interest that exists when
pharmaceutical companies fund the educational seminars and
conferences of external professional organizations. Subsection B
examines the conflict of interest when pharmaceutical companies
sponsor their own speaker programs. The analysis suggests that
the conflict of interest explored in Subsection A is an acceptable
one that can be effectively managed,250 whereas the conflict in
Subsection B is unacceptable and cannot be rendered acceptable
through conflict of interest management protocols.251
A. Conflict of Interest When Pharmaceutical Companies Fund
the Continuing Medical Education Offered by External
Professional Organizations
Recall that Opinion 9.2.7 of the current version of the AMA
Code of Medical Ethics says whenever possible, CME funding and
staffing should come from independent sources that do not have a
financial relationship with either the industry or the educational
See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
See id.
249 See id.
250 See id. (describing one perspective of the intentions set forth in previous opinion 8.061).
251 See id. (describing another perspective of the intentions set forth in the
same opinion).
247
248

64 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:023
subject matter.252 When funding and staffing from independent
sources is not possible, those who “organize ..., teach ..., or have
other roles in ... CME”253 must:
(a) Be transparent about financial relationships that could
potentially influence educational activities.
(b) Provide the information physician-learners need to make
critical judgments about an educational activity, including:
1. The source(s) and nature of commercial support for
the activity
2. The source(s) and nature of any individual financial
relationships with industry related to the subject matter of the activity
3. What steps have been taken to mitigate the potential
influence of financial relationships
(c) Protect the independence of educational activities by:
1. Ensuring independent, prospective assessment of educational needs and priorities
2. Adhering to a transparent process for prospectively
determining when industry support is needed
3. Giving preference in selecting faculty or content developers to similarly qualified experts who do not have
financial interests in the educational subject matter
4. Ensuring a transparent process for making decisions
about participation by physicians who may have a financial interest in the educational subject matter
5. Permitting individuals who have a substantial financial
interest in the educational subject matter to participate in CME only when their participation is central
to the success of the educational activity; the activity
meets a demonstrated need in the professional community; and the source, nature, and magnitude of the
individual’s specific financial interest is disclosed
6. Taking steps to mitigate potential influence commensurate with the nature of the financial interest(s) at
issue, such as prospective peer review.254

This current approach liberalizes a more stringent position in Previous Version Opinion 8.061 of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics, which sought to reduce potential conflicts of interest
See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 (stating “[w]hen possible, CME should
be provided without such support or the participation of individuals who have
financial interests in the educational subject matter.”).
253 See id.
254 See id.
252
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regarding CME in two clear, direct, simple, straightforward ways.255
It required company subsidies that benefit professional conference
attendees to be indirect,256 and it prohibited company sponsors
from influencing conference content, materials, and presenters.257
Current Opinion 9.2.7 contains no language expressly prohibiting the payment of conference subsidies directly to physicians
who attend the event.258 Likewise, it no longer contains the outright prohibition that was in Previous Opinion 8.061 against sponsors exercising influence over content, materials, or presenters.259
The more elaborate list of relatively vague steps contained in
Current Opinion 9.2.7 for managing transparency and objectivity
are slippery: they lack the substance, gravitas, and straightforward
clarity of the previous, more concise restrictions of Previous Opinion
8.061.260 They make it hard or impossible to pin down what is or
is not a violation.261 They leave far too much judgment and discretion to physicians facing tempting, remunerative opportunities to
serve themselves rather than their patients.262
Motives for the change can only be speculated, as professional codes do not come with the historic documentation that we
get in legislative history.263 At best, the changes were intended
to create more CME opportunities by removing the previously
tight, clear restrictions. At worst, they may be motivated in part
or in full by self-interested industry pressures, practitioner pressures, or both.
The requirements in both the current version and the
previous version do evince recognition by the medical profession
of the need to address conflict of interest when pharmaceutical
companies provide benefits to doctors.264 But do they sufficiently
255
256

See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
See id. (stating “[s]ubsidies from industry should not be accepted directly

....”).
See id. (describing how sponsor subsidies should be used for conferences).
See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 (lacking any prohibition regarding the
direct payment of conference subsidies towards physicians).
259 See id. (lacking restriction of sponsors influencing conferences).
260 See id.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See generally Opinion 8.061, supra note 49; Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
264 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (stating “there has been growing concern about certain gifts from industry to physicians. Some gifts that reflect
257

258
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manage and control the conflict of interest? Previous Opinion
8.061 did sufficiently manage the conflict of interest for doctors,265 but the muddier expectations in Current Opinion 9.2.7
fail to acceptably address the conflict of interest.266
Opinion 8.061 did not eliminate the subsidy running from
companies to doctors, but it did strongly attenuate it by channeling it through the conference sponsors.267 Physicians still received
conference cost savings, and of course they saw conference program recognition lists of the sponsors of the conferences they attend.268 So conference attendees had the information to be aware
that they are paying less to attend the conference, or getting
more benefits, or both, because Company X was a sponsor.269
In theory, of course, this could still have created a sense of
gratitude and indebtedness.270 However, because medical conferences typically have multiple pharmaceutical company271
sponsors providing only indirect financial support under Former
Opinion 8.061,272 the conflict of interest was diluted and attenuated via the indirect nature of the sponsorship.273 A doctor is unlikely to be swayed in her prescriptions by minor and indirect
financial support.274
customary practices of industry may not be consistent with the Principles of
Medical Ethics.”); Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 (stating “[f]inancial or in-kind
support from ... companies that have a direct interest in physicians’ recommendations creates conditions in which external interests could influence the
availability and/or content of continuing medical education (CME).”).
265 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
266 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
267 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (stating “any subsidy should be accepted by the conference’s sponsor who in turn can use the money to reduce
the conference’s registration fee.”).
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See id. (stating “[s]ome gifts that reflect customary practices of industry
may not be consistent with the Principles of Medical Ethics.”).
271 ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MED. EDUC., ACCME DATA
REPORT: GROWTH AND DIVERSITY IN CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION—2017,
6 (2018).
272 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (describing how financial support
provided by sponsors is utilized).
273 See id. (describing all the limitations to the directness of sponsorship
gifts to physicians).
274 See id.
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Indeed, many or most attendees might not even be thinking about any informal or implied sense of indebtedness, given
that the transaction’s influence was spread across all attendees
and made remote through the intermediary of the conference organizers.275 In addition, when a number of the manufacturers of
competing treatments sponsor a professional meeting, their subsidies effectively cancel each other out in terms of corrupt influence over patient treatment decisions.276
Given the social value of continuing medical education as
well as the substantial cost of conferences,277 the Former Opinion
8.061 requirement that conference subsidies were not directly paid
to attendees was a reasonable compromise between encouraging
continuing education and managing conflicts of interest.278 The
subsidies contributed to the goal of keeping practitioner knowledge
fresh and updated, yet they were unlikely to taint patient treatment
decisions generally and prescription patterns specifically.279
See id. An analogy easily comes to mind to any law scholar: the sponsorship of law faculty conference events by textbook publishers. Technically,
those who attend benefit from sponsorship. But all or virtually all textbook
publishers sponsor, and it is unlikely that any law professor’s textbook adoption decisions are influenced by this attenuated benefit. The benefit is diluted
when most of all the publishing companies sponsor, and law faculty likely are
not making the connection between the benefit and their decisions. Quid-proquo dynamics are negligible if most competitors in an industry are sponsors,
and the benefit passes through the organizer of the conference.
276 See id. (explaining how conference resources should be allocated and
organized. Here, conference organizers are able to control the conference context rather than sponsoring companies).
277 Attending a conference will typically entail a substantial cash outlay.
These costs to attendees typically include payment of a registration fee, purchase of airfare and hotel accommodation, payment of ground transportation,
and the cost of meals. See Joseph Hong, The High Cost of Opportunity: Paying
for Academic Conferences, DIVERSE EDUC. (Jan. 15, 2018), https://diverseedu
cation.com/article/108234/ [https://perma.cc/VE2T-M4VF] (demonstrating that
conferences serve as “economic barriers for early-career academics.”). The
amount of the registration fee, and how many meals are included with that
fee, obviously are affected by how much of these are underwritten by conference sponsors. See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (stating “any subsidy should
be accepted by the conference’s sponsor who in turn can use the money to reduce the conference’s registration fee.”).
278 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (demonstrating the difficulty in balancing
the social benefits and violation of ethics in regard to industry gifts to physicians).
279 See id.
275
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Former Opinion 8.061’s prohibition of company sponsors’
influencing of conference content, materials, and presenters was
an effective and appropriate second prong in addressing the conflict of interest challenges in these situations.280 One peril that
both society and patients should worry about is that drug company payments will subvert the objective medical judgment of
practitioners.281 The content, materials, and presenters restriction
effectively covered the various ways that a corporate sponsor might,
if allowed, attempt to sway practitioner judgment by injecting
biased content into the conference proceedings themselves.282
In other words, the two prongs of Opinion 8.061—banning
direct payment to doctors, and prohibiting influence over content,
materials, and presenters—elegantly and effectively covered the
two avenues by which company sponsorship might undermine
practitioner objectivity: payoffs and biased indoctrination.283
Unfortunately, these safeguards that rendered industry
sponsorship of CME acceptable in light of conflict of interest
challenges have been eviscerated in a smokescreen of replacement language that may seem impressive on its face, but actually
achieves little.284 The ephemeral, slippery, vague edicts in Current Opinion 9.2.7 simply fail to provide the same protections of
Previous Version 8.061.285 A careful reading of the long new list
of standards286 demonstrates that they really do not require much
that can be pinned down.287
Instead, they repeatedly exhort the parties to “ensure” to
“adhere” to “take steps” to “give preference to.”288 How do you determine exactly what these kinds of slippery edicts mean? The
safeguards, even if created with the best intentions and in the best
spirit, are illusory because they leave everything to the judgment of
the very people who face highly tempting conflicts of interest.289
See id.
See Johns, supra note 57, at 970.
282 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
283 See id.
284 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
285 See id.; see also Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
286 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
287 See id.
288 Id.
289 See id.
280
281
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B. Conflict of Interest in Drug Company-Hosted Speaker Programs
Pharmaceutical companies routinely host their own speaker
programs, compensating the presenters with speaker fees and
also inviting and entertaining attendees, typically with high-end
dinners and drinks.290 These companies have incentives to select
both speakers and attendees based on their own marketing objectives, rather than on truly disinterested educational goals.291
From the standpoint of marketing strategy, it makes good business
sense if presenters are prescribing physicians, or prospectively
prescribing physicians who regularly meet with the companies’
pharmaceutical representatives, or physicians with whom the
representatives want to create such a relationship.292
Company-hosted speaker programs are not inherently either noble or nefarious. They are, however, fraught with conflicts and a substantial risk that their content and objectives will
be biased.293 The serious risks associated with speaker programs
are far from theoretical. While speaker programs are not legally
prohibited, rampant abuses have resulted in many millions of
dollars in settlements for charges under federal statutes that
290 See Adriane Fugh-Berman & Nuria Homedes, How Drug Companies
Manipulate Prescribing Behavior, 46 COLOM. J. ANESTHESIOLOGY 317, 318
(2018) (“A rep may invite a physician to give a dinner talk to a small group at
an excellent restaurant. The subject of the talk does not matter, because this
is a chance for the rep to both honor and pay the speaker, who then responds
by prescribing more of the rep’s drugs.”).
291 See id. at 318–19.
292 See Alix Spiegel, How to Win Doctors And Influence Prescriptions, NPR
(Oct. 21, 2010, 4:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=130730104 [https://perma.cc/JL7V-ZJRX]. Pharmaceutical representatives
typically are assigned to a geographical district, where they are tasked to
meet with a targeted group of physicians. See What Does a Pharmaceutical
Sales Representative Do?, CAREEREXPLORER, https://www.careerexplorer.com
/careers/pharmaceutical-sales-representative/ [https://perma.cc/A44U-VQ4W].
These representatives organize the speaker programs and select both the
speakers and the invitees. See id. Some are physicians who already substantially prescribe the company’s products, and the task here is to maintain both
the relationship and the strong prescription numbers. See id. Others are physicians who do not prescribe the company’s products in desired numbers, whom
the company seeks to win over. See id.
293 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–20.
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are not even aimed at the pharmaceutical industry.294 These include a $38 million settlement under the False Claims Act as well
as several multimillion-dollar settlements under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.295
The main government tools to curtail continuing and rampant abuses are “Corporate Integrity Agreements” (CIAs) that can
be required by the Office of Inspector General.296 While CIAs likely
do make some headway against abusive practices, the perils of
company-sponsored speaker programs outweigh the benefits,
and they should simply be eliminated.297
Granted, pharmaceutical companies’ own speaker programs
do have a potential social benefit: the education of the healthcare professionals who attend them.298 If—and this is a big if—a
company’s own programs can somehow maintain complete objectivity and not be tainted by conflict of interest—they can add to
the knowledge of prescribing practitioners.299
Pharmaceutical companies are certainly in a good position
to educate practitioners for two reasons. First, the companies
are a source of much high quality, useful information.300 By virtue
of the time and expertise they invest in developing drug treatments,301 they are among the institutions most likely to have a
wealth of information.
Second, pharmaceutical companies have tremendous resources—arguably unmatched by other institutions—to devote
Richard L. Cassin, Compliance Alert: Speaker Fees Are Often Toxic,
FCPA BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2017/1/4/compliance
-alert-speaker-fees-are-often-toxic/ [https://perma.cc/S4PB-JJAY].
295 Id.
296 See COGNIZANT 20-20 INSIGHTS, HELPING PHARMAS MANAGE COMPLIANCE RISKS FOR SPEAKER PROGRAMS 4 (2017).
297 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 41, at 10, 184–85.
298 See id. at 2, 9, 155.
299 See id.
300 See Geoffrey K. Spurling et al., Information from Pharmaceutical Companies and the Quality, Quantity, and Cost of Physicians’ Prescribing: A Systematic
Review, 7 PLOS MED 1, 2 (Oct. 2010).
301 See Matej Mikulic, Total Global Pharmaceutical R&D Spending 2010–
2024, STATISTA (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/309466/global
-r-and-d-expenditure-for-pharmaceuticals/ [https://perma.cc/YZ6E-2WQK] (reporting global pharmaceutical industry R&D expenditure for 2018 as $179 billion).
294
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to the education of healthcare professionals.302 They have the funds
to be among the most effective providers to physicians of current
scientific and medical information regarding treatment options.303
However, great risks are associated with pharmaceutical
company speaker series. The following subsections examine these
risks: the risk that pharmaceutical companies will not present
information entirely accurately and objectively; the risk that paid
speakers will not be objective and impartial; the risk that paid program speakers lose their objectivity in decisions regarding prescription of the company’s products; and the risk that company
provision of dining, drinks, and social entertainment will hinder
the objectivity of physicians who attend the programs as learners.
After examining all these risks, we examine the relative
likelihood of pharmaceutical company speaker programs being
predominantly beneficial or predominantly harmful. Finally, we
discuss whether disclosure of conflict of interest is a sufficient
safeguard to protect patients’ interest such that drug company
speaker programs should be acceptable as long as the disclosure
is made.
1. The Risk that Paid Pharmaceutical Company Speakers
Will Not Present Information Accurately and Objectively
Pharmaceutical companies do not spend money educating
physicians as philanthropy; they are profit-seeking businesses.304
There is a conflict of interest when companies host speaker programs to increase sales.305 Revenue goals put pressure on companies to sell, and not simply to provide forums where information
is objectively presented.306
302 See STATISTA, INDUSTRY REPORT, MANUFACTURING: PHARMACEUTICALS
& MEDICINE IN THE U.S. 2020, 65 (June 2018), https://www.statista.com/study/45
278/manufacturing-pharmaceuticals-and-medicine/
[https://perma.cc/Z2B9
-KMUM] (“The industry realized a total value of shipments of US$268.6 billion in 2017, a growth of 8.8% compared to 2016.”).
303 See id.
304 Margaret Visnji, Understanding the New Pharma Business Model, R&P
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://revenuesandprofits.com/understanding-the-new-pharma
-business-model/ [https://perma.cc/2SHH-AJPM] (“Pharma companies like any
other business are here to make money.”).
305 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318.
306 This pressure has led, for example, to accounts and FDA documentation of
“repeated instances of pharmaceutical representatives presenting one-sided
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It can be argued that professional ethics can and should
deter pharmaceutical companies from slanting information in their
speaker programs.307 It would be foolish and naïve to expect professional ethics to curtail the conflict of interest regularly and
consistently, given the intense financial performance pressures
that pharmaceutical companies face.308
Indeed, there is a crucially important logical inconsistency
in how the AMA Code addresses the danger of drug companies
skewing the content of professional education.309 The AMA Code
recognizes the ethical risks when drug companies sponsor external conferences and continuing medical education.310 It fails,
however, to address the even greater risks of company speaker
programs that feature highly paid practitioner speakers.311
2. The Risk That Paid Program Speakers Lose Their
Objectivity in Decisions Regarding Prescription of the
Company’s Products
When pharmaceutical companies pay speaker fees, the
compensated doctors can easily lose their impartiality in prescription decisions.312 We would hope that doctors would rise
information that downplays risks and negates warnings.” Vukadin, supra
note 24, at 84. For discussion of revenue drivers in the pharmaceutical industry,
see generally Ajay Gautam, The Changing Model of Big Pharma: Impact of Key
Trends, 21 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 379, 384 (Mar. 2016).
307 See ADRIAN KILCOYNE ET AL. EDS., PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 363
(2013) (“[T]he pharmaceutical industry has an obligation to communicate
health information with integrity, accuracy, clarity, and completeness. This
ethical obligation goes above and beyond any legal requirements.”).
308 See Matthias Evers et al., How Pharma Manufacturers Can Enhance
Their Medical Information Teams, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 9, 2018), https://
www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-in
sights/how-pharma-manufacturers-can-enhance-their-medical-information-teams
[https://perma.cc/HS7Z-NNGK] (“[P]harmaceutical manufacturers are under pressure to find more efficient operating models to reduce operating costs ....”).
309 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318; infra text accompanying notes 316–17.
310 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 and text accompanying note 73.
311 The ethical risks of company speaker programs are even greater than the
risks of company involvement in external CME programs, because in the former,
no impartial host exists who can at least try to focus on and ensure objectivity
and purity of motives.
312 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–20.
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above the conflict of interest and maintain their objectivity, but
this is naïve and unrealistic.313
Disturbingly, one study found that while 85 percent of medical students recognize the impropriety of politicians accepting
gifts, only 46 percent believe it is improper for themselves to accept a gift of the same value from a pharmaceutical company.314
This is distressing because a physician’s ethical responsibility
when treating patients is to provide them with the best possible
care.315 This duty is undermined by paid speaker programs in
two ways: through the operation of reciprocity norms and informal
indebtedness,316 and through the creation of warped incentives
for the speaking physicians.317
a. The Operation of Reciprocity Norms and Informal
Indebtedness
A physician who is handsomely paid by a drug manufacturer
may feel indebted to the company that provided the opportunity.318
See id.
Paul Palmisano & Joan Edelstein, Teaching Drug Promotion Abuses to
Health Professional Students, 55 J. MED. EDUC. 453, 455 (1980).
315 See AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, https://www
.ama-assn.org/about/publications-newsletters/ama-principles-medical-ethics
[https://perma.cc/G3EQ-K3V4] (Jun. 2001) (“A physician shall, while caring
for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”).
316 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318.
317 See id.
318 Henry et al. have also identified the problem of “entanglement,” a tendency for pharmaceutical companies and clinical researchers to build bundles
of relationships that contribute to reciprocation of favor. David Henry et al.,
Ties that Bind: Multiple Relationships Between Clinical Researchers and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2493, 2493 (2005)
(“Research collaboration, an important and growing area of engagement between industry and clinical researchers, may lead to other significant relationships, such as advisory panel membership, payment for consultation to
the industry, and substantial recompense to attend international conferences.
These ties may create a sense of collegiality, and the resulting obligation and need
to reciprocate may not be consciously felt.”) (citation omitted). Such multilayered bundles of entanglement exacerbate the concerns about paid speaker
series. Id. at 2495–96. Not only may paid physicians skew their prescription
patterns out of a sense of indebtedness; they may also consciously or unconsciously skew their findings or actions relating to any research component
that is included in the bundle of activities. Id.
313
314
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This is simply human nature, the playing out of well-documented
human reciprocity norms.319 Payment can create in the recipient
both gratitude and a desire or even a tacit requirement320 to return commensurate value to the payer.321 Reciprocity norms are
so ingrained in us that they have become culturally and linguistically entrenched;322 for example, we say that we need to invite
friends to dinner because “we owe them” in return for past hospitality that they provided to us.
This language reflects an urge to approach transactional
equilibrium in relationships.323 Reciprocity norms do not end
when we leave the dinner table and go to work.324 Pharmaceutical representatives who regularly visit a set of physicians strive
to develop strong relationships with their doctors;325 indeed,
basic attributes for which pharmaceutical representatives are
hired are their persuasive abilities and their skill at building
strong relationships.326 After all, their job is sales.327
See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,
25 AM. SOCIO. REV. 161, 161, 177–78 (1960) (examining in detail the nature of human
reciprocity norms); Mark A. Whatley et al., The Effect of a Favor on Public and
Private Compliance: How Internalized is the Norm of Reciprocity?, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 251, 251–52 (1999) (discussing and examining reciprocity norms).
320 This tacit requirement aspect of reciprocity is a function of what Keohane
calls the “conditional action” implication of reciprocity. Robert O. Keohane,
Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1, 5 (1986). There is an
exchange of benefits, each understood to be conditional on the other. See id.
321 The social exchange literature discusses this in terms of “equivalence.”
PETER M. BLAU, ON THE NATURE OF ORGANIZATIONS 208–09 (1974).
322 See Gouldner, supra note 319, at 171–72.
323 See Michael E. McCullough et al., An Adaptation for Altruism? The Social
Causes, Social Effects, and Social Evolution of Gratitude, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCH. SCI. 281, 281 (2008) (“People feel grateful when they have benefitted
from someone’s costly, intentional, voluntary effort on their behalf. Experiencing gratitude motivates beneficiaries to repay their benefactors ....”).
324 See BLAU, supra note 321, at 209.
325 See Michael J. Oldani, Thick Prescriptions: Toward an Interpretation of
Pharmaceutical Sales Practices, 18 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 325, 332 (2004)
(discussing building rapport, creating alliances, and gaining returns as measured
in script numbers as among the multiple goals of pharmaceutical salespersons).
326 Job listing templates recommend stating this job expectation upfront. See,
e.g., Pharmaceutical Sales Representative Job Description, WORKABLE, https://
resources.workable.com/pharmaceutical-sales-representative-job-description
[https://perma.cc/3PHP-U883] (including among the three recommended job
responsibilities to list, “[l]iaising with and persuading targeted doctors to prescribe our products utilizing effective sales skills.”).
327 See id.
319
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The scenario is this: the pharmaceutical representative,
who has developed a good relationship with a doctor over time,
communicates over the course of their many meetings a desire to
have the doctor increase her prescription count for a drug the
representative is marketing. At a strategic time, the pharmaceutical representative offers the doctor a lucrative opportunity to be a
paid speaker.
The doctor meets reciprocity norm expectations by returning the favor and increasing the number of prescriptions.328
Whenever a physician’s prescription decisions are influenced by
anything other than what is in the best interest of the patient’s
treatment, there exists a problem.329
b. The Creation of Warped Incentives for the Speaking
Physicians
If reciprocity norms were the only dynamic at play in
pharmaceutical company speaker programs, we might hope that
professional ethics would prevail, and prescription decisions might
remain immune to improper influences. Unfortunately, given
human self-interest, this would be an unrealistic hope.330
Moreover, the inclination to establish relational equilibrium by returning favors331 is not the only peril of drug company
speaker programs.332 Physicians’ desire for repeat paid speaking
invitations may influence the content of their presentations.333
Doctors presumably agree to accept speaker invitations
because such engagements are highly desirable.334 Of course,
there are innocuous or even positive factors that might encourage

See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–19.
See id. at 320.
330 See BLAU, infra note 331, at 2–7.
331 This cycle of back-and-forth favors is at the heart of reciprocity norms.
See PETER BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 6 (1964) (observing that
reciprocity entails “actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from
others and that cease when these expected reactions are not forthcoming”).
332 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 317.
333 See id. at 319–20.
334 See id. at 318–19.
328
329

76 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:023
doctors to be speakers.335 If a doctor’s ego is gratified by having a
platform to speak as an expert, this may well be an innocuous
inducement.336 It is not likely to cause the speaker to sacrifice
objectivity in the content delivered.337 Likewise, if part of the
desirability of speaking is benevolent—a desire to share expertise and knowledge to benefit the profession and patients—participation in a speaker program certainly can have positive effects. Not all speakers at pharmaceutical company programs
lack objectivity or are improperly influenced in the content they
present.338
Nonetheless, emolument is a potent factor in the desirability
of speaking engagements.339 Speaker programs pay doctors generously.340 They are typically attractive dining and drinking events
in expensive restaurants as well, creating a pleasant opportunity
to socialize with colleagues and professional friends.341 Some
doctors will value these engagements and work to encourage future invitations.342 Presenting material favorable to the host
company and its products increases the prospect of repeat invitations.343 This creates an unacceptable risk to patients, whose
treatments may be affected by biased content presented at these
events.344

See Spiegel, supra note 292.
See Freek Fickweiler et al., Interactions Between Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry Generally and Sales Representatives Specifically and Their
Association with Physicians’ Attitudes and Prescribing Habits: A Systematic
Review, 7 BMJ OPEN, Sept. 27, 2017, at 1 (majority of physicians believe pharmaceutical industry interactions have no impact on them).
337 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 319–20.
338 See id.
339 See Cassie Demeter, 69% of Pharmaceutical Companies Pay Their Speakers
Based on Quality, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:16 AM), https://www.business
wire.com/news/home/20140106005287/en/69-Pharmaceutical-Companies-Pay
-Speakers-based-Quality [http://perma.cc/3KSD-3HZ8].
340 See id. (reporting that speaker payments among surveyed companies
averaged $1,677, and that “[c]ompanies may spend as much as $6,000 on a
single speaker to entice him or her to speak at an event”).
341 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318.
342 See id.
343 See id. at 320.
344 See Under the Influence, WAIKATO TIMES, Apr. 12, 2014, at 6.
335
336
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c. The Risk that Company Provision of Dining, Drinks,
and Social Entertainment Will Hinder the Objectivity of
Physicians Who Attend the Programs as Learners
Pharmaceutical company speaker programs raise another
concern: the provision of education and entertainment directly
from a manufacturer to an audience of invited physicians.345
Like the speakers, these doctors can be selected based on the company’s sales objectives.346 And given the profit motive of business,
why would they not be?
As the direct recipients of education, dining, drinks, and
entertainment, they are subject to both of the dynamics discussed in the preceding two subsections.347 This direct provision
of benefit to company speaker series attendees, which was
deemed unacceptable by Previous Opinion 8.061 of the AMA
Code at continuing medical education events,348 is not prohibited
by either the AMA or the PhRMA.349
Yet attendees are subject to reciprocity norms at these
events, at least as much as they would be at CME conferences.350
Moreover, they have incentives to curry future invitations, since
unlike CME events that are open to all doctors, company-hosted
speaker series are invitational events.351 As we have seen, we
should be concerned that the content of the talk they will hear
will not be scientifically objective, but rather skewed in favor of
the host company’s product.352
While the same quid pro quo dynamics apply to physicians
in the audience as to physicians engaged to speak, the magnitude
See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–19.
See Allan S. Brett et al., Are Gifts from Pharmaceutical Companies
Ethically Problematic? A Survey of Physicians, 163 ARCH INTERNAL MED.
2213, 2217 (2003) (“[T]he AMA guidelines focus inordinately on fine distinctions regarding the value or type of gifts, and are not sufficiently concerned
with the ultimate rationale for industry-sponsored gifts and activities, ie, to
establish relationships with physicians that yield increased sales of a company’s products.”).
347 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318.
348 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49.
349 See Brett et al., supra note 346, at 2217.
350 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318.
351 See id. at 319.
352 See id. at 320.
345
346
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of the conflict-based risk is, of course, lower for those attending
than for those speaking.353 This is a function of the degree of the
benefit conferred. Speaker fees are likely to be valued higher
than receipt of a free seminar and meal.354 Of course, to the extent that a target group of physicians is rotated from occasional
speaker roles at some programs to audience member roles at
others, an overall package of treats for physicians results.355
Sometimes a doctor is the paid speaker; other times she is a
generously entertained guest.356 This overall relational package
is fraught with implications of indebtedness, undesirable incentives, and potentially skewed content.357
d. The Relative Likelihood of Pharmaceutical Company
Speaker Programs Being Predominantly Beneficial or
Predominantly Harmful
The harms of company speaker programs outweigh the
benefits.358 The single possible benefit is the education of doctors.359
Even this benefit is not weighty, given the various alternative
sources of knowledge and information available to medical practitioners in 2020, including that which now comes out of research
universities.360 This single benefit of company speaker programs
is tainted by all the conflicts of interest we have explored.361
Abundant external medical conferences and seminars, as
noted earlier, can ethically be financially supported by companies under appropriate guidelines, which this Article has already
suggested are those that were contained in Previous Opinion
8.061 of the AMA Code, rather than the diluted guidelines that
See infra note 354 and accompanying text.
This proposition seems likely, given the generous fees speakers are
paid at these events. See Demeter, supra note 339.
355 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318.
356 See id.
357 See id.
358 See infra notes 359–66 and accompanying text.
359 See Howard Brody, Pharmaceutical Industry Financial Support for
Medical Education: Benefit, or Undue Influence?, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 451,
451 (2009).
360 See supra Section II.A.
361 See generally Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290.
353
354

2020]

MEDICAL JUDGMENT AND MARKETING

79

replaced it in 2016.362 Scholarly and professional medical journals also are widely available,363 and of course the Internet provides a wealth of information.364 Although Internet information
on all subjects must be carefully assessed for credibility,365 it is
reasonable to expect trained physicians to evaluate sources with
a critical eye.
No laws, regulations, professional or industrial codes, or
policies presently prohibit pharmaceutical company-hosted
speaker programs.366 And as we shall see in the following Subsection, disclosure requirements are inadequate to address the
conflict of interest and attendant moral peril that we have explored here regarding speaker programs.
e. Disclosure of Conflict of Interest Is a Positive Step, but It
Is Insufficient to Protect Patients’ Interests
In several countries, law or regulation requires the public
disclosure of payments that doctors receive from drug companies.367 In the United States, the Physician Payments Sunshine
Act requires that drug manufacturers disclose comprehensive
information regarding payments, including honoraria, to “covered recipients.”368 Failure to disclose financial conflicts of interest may be considered research misconduct.369
See supra Section III.A.
See Karen M. Albert, Open Access: Implications for Scholarly Publishing and Medical Libraries, 94 J. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 253 (2006) (discussing how
open access publishing facilitates access to research publications).
364 See id. at 255.
365 See Karen Struthers, Assessing the Credibility of Online Sources, LEO:
LITERACY EDUC. ONLINE (Jan. 7, 2005), https://leo.stcloudstate.edu/research
/credibility1.html [https://perma.cc/N5L4-BKMP] (offering a checklist of criteria for evaluating the credibility of an online source, based on authorship,
publisher, currency, perspectives, coverage, and accuracy or verifiability).
366 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 320.
367 See Under the Influence, supra note 344 (“Around the world, countries
are increasingly requiring public disclosure of drug company gifts and payments to doctors.”).
368 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A) (2010) (requiring, inter alia, that “any
applicable manufacturer that provides a payment or other transfer of value to
a covered recipient (or to an entity or individual at the request of or designated
on behalf of a covered recipient), shall submit to the Secretary, in such electronic
362
363
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This reported information is readily accessible to patients,
as well as prospective patients who want to research their options, via a government website.370 As the header to the website
states, “[t]he Open Payments Search Tool is used to search
payments made by drug and medical device companies to physicians and teaching hospitals.”371 The site also discloses the
amounts of these payments, and as of this writing, the most recent
aggregate data on the disclosed payments is for 2019, showing a
total reported of $10.03 billion.372
The site has a tab that explains the function of the data:
“Open Payments is a national disclosure program that promotes
a more transparent and accountable health care system by making the financial relationships between applicable manufacturers
and group purchasing organizations (GPOs) and health care providers (physicians and teaching hospitals) available to the public.”373
form as the Secretary shall require, the following information with respect to
the preceding calendar year: (i) The name of the covered recipient. (ii) The
business address of the covered recipient and, in the case of a covered recipient who is a physician, the specialty and National Provider Identifier of the
covered recipient. (iii) The amount of the payment or other transfer of value.
(iv) The dates on which the payment or other transfer of value was provided
to the covered recipient. (v) A description of the form of the payment or other
transfer of value, indicated (as appropriate for all that apply) as—(I) cash or
a cash equivalent; (II) in-kind items or services; (III) stock, a stock option, or
any other ownership interest, dividend, profit, or other return on investment;
or (IV) any other form of payment or other transfer of value (as defined by the
Secretary). (vi) A description of the nature of the payment or other transfer of
value, indicated (as appropriate for all that apply) as—(I) consulting fees; (II)
compensation for services other than consulting; (III) honoraria; (IV) gift; (V)
entertainment; (VI) food; (VII) travel (including the specified destinations); (VIII)
education; (IX) research; (X) charitable contribution; (XI) royalty or license; (XII)
current or prospective ownership or investment interest; (XIII) direct compensation for serving as faculty or as a speaker for a medical education program; (XIV) grant; or (XV) any other nature of the payment or other transfer
of value (as defined by the Secretary).”).
369 See generally Jeffrey R. Botkin, Should Failure to Disclose Significant
Financial Conflicts of Interest Be Considered Research Misconduct?, 320
JAMA 2307, 2308 (2018).
370 See Search Open Payments, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://openpaymentsdata.cms.gov [https://perma.cc/53PG-43FR].
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id. at Learn More About Open Payments tab, https://www.cms.gov/open
payments [https://perma.cc/6G9Y-DVK9].
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Unfortunately, disclosure is inadequate to address conflict
of interest concerns.374 If disclosure of physician payments is to
protect patients, we would want evidence that patients actually
retrieve and use the information. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise.375 In addition, there are systemic conditions in
place that limit the effectiveness of information and disclosure
as means of managing conflicts of interest.376 The following discussion addresses these two limitations, and concludes that disclosure does not sufficiently address the conflict of interest when
drug companies pay prescribing physicians as presenters in their
speaker programs.
i. Evidence Suggests that Few Patients Consult the
Currently Available Information Regarding
Physician Payments
Unfortunately, the information collected and published
under the Physician Payments Sunshine Act is rarely used.377 Of
3,500 adult patients in one year studied, sixty-five percent had
seen physicians who had received a payment or gift from either
a drug or medical device company, but only five percent were
aware of the payment or gift.378
It is not surprising that few patients use the data available. Some will be unaware that the database exists.379 People are
busy, life is complex, and information on every conceivable topic
abounds on the Internet.380 Moreover, information is often conflicting, even information provided by “experts,”381 tempting the
See infra Section III.B.2.e.i–ii.
See infra Section III.B.2.e.i.
376 See infra Section III.B.2.e.i.
377 See Many Doctors Get Payments from Drug Companies, Study Shows,
HEALTHDAY (Mar. 21, 2017), https://consumer.healthday.com/general-health
-information-16/doctor-news-206/many-doctors-get-payments-from-drug-compa
nies-study-shows-720434.html [https://perma.cc/K6XZ-S9BD].
378 See id.
379 See id.
380 See Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing
Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 52 (1998) (“The
amount of information has expanded far beyond our ability to process or comprehend it.”).
381 See Nathan F. Dieckmann et al., Public Perceptions of Expert Disagreement:
Bias and Incompetence or a Complex and Random World?, 26 PUB. UNDERSTANDING OF SCI. 325 (2017) (noting expert disagreement may be perceived by
374
375
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public to give up on disclosure models created to ensure their
safety.382 We are both weary and wary of seeking and evaluating
disclosures and warnings.383
What remains is a philosophical question: Does it matter
that few patients are aware of conflicts of interest, given that
the conflicts can easily be discovered?384 Some will say it does not
matter, and that the information is readily available, thus individual patients should be responsible for doing research relating to
their treatment choices, including the doctor they select.385 This
approach would lean toward a philosophy of minimal regulation
and even minimal professional and industry self-regulation.386 Under this philosophy, as many potential hazards as possible should
be addressed solely through disclosure, rather than through legal or ethics code prohibitions or self-prohibitions, with the goal
of minimizing government, professional, and industry controls
and maximizing freedoms of both consumers and businesses.387
A counterargument focuses on realities rather than on
theory: the vast majority of patients are not aware of pharmaceutical company payments to their physician, despite the information
knowledgeable, educated people as reflecting things such as complexity, randomness, and financial bias).
382 See Petra Persson, Attention Manipulation and Information Overload,
2 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 1, 78 (2018).
383 The literature discusses this phenomenon in terms of information overload. See, e.g., id. at 78 (discussing how “[c]ompetitive information supply
from firms competing for attention can reduce consumers’ knowledge by causing
information overload.”); Josephine B. Schmitt et al., Too Much Information?
Predictors of Information Overload in the Context of Online News Exposure,
21 INFO. COMM. & SOC. 1151, 1151 (2018) (“The difficulty to evaluate and select relevant information increases as more and more diverse sources and
content are available.”).
384 See Many Doctors Get Payments from Drug Companies, Study Shows,
supra note 377.
385 See id.
386 For discussion of this regulation reduction philosophy, see John W. Mayo,
The Evolution of Regulation: Twentieth Century Lessons and Twenty-First
Century Opportunities, 65 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 119, 126 (2013) (“[B]eginning
in the 1960s, economists began to look upon the institution of regulation with
newfound skepticism. This skeptical inquiry revealed that regulation was an
imperfect governance mechanism that could not be assumed to promote the public interest. A second, more subtle but potentially more profound driver came from
policymakers who saw deregulation as a means to promote an ideological end,
specifically to ease governmental coercion and promote economic freedoms.”).
387 See id. at 120.
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being available online.388 While patients can protect themselves
from improperly influenced treatment, almost none actually do.389
Arguably, regulation or professional/industry self-regulation protective of the public is sometimes justified, even when it constrains
some freedoms such as physicians’ freedom to contract with companies.390 If so, this is one such situation. Prohibition or curtailment of conflicts may be the only way to protect the public, since
the disclosure does not provide appreciable protection.391
One final consideration: when disclosure is used to shield
the public from perils, there may be socio-economic differences
in who is protected and who is not, due to the digital divide.392
The poor have less ready access than the wealthy to computers,
connections, and the Internet, and therefore to information disclosed and retrievable on websites,393 and minorities have less
access than non-minorities.394 Unsurprisingly, studies suggest
that those with lower educational and income levels are generally
disadvantaged in the quality of both the healthcare that they
receive and their health generally.395
Should this socio-economic discrepancy influence our decision between allowing the conflict of interest activities we have
been discussing subject to disclosure, versus outright prohibiting
See supra text accompanying note 378.
See supra text accompanying note 378.
390 See generally INST. OF MED., PROMOTING HEALTH: INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FROM SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2000).
391 See Many Doctors Get Payments from Drug Companies, Study Shows,
supra note 377.
392 Edwards describes the digital divide as “the increasingly disparate access
to, knowledge of, and use of technology in this country that is a function of race or
ethnic group, physical disability, income, education, gender, household composition, age, and location.” Yolanda D. Edwards, Looking Beyond the Digital
Divide, 57 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 585 (2005) (reviewing ANTHONY G. WILHELM,
DIGITAL NATION: TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2004)).
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 See Nicholas C. Arpey et al., How Socioeconomic Status Affects Patient
Perceptions of Health Care: A Qualitative Study, 8 J. PRIMARY CARE & CMTY.
HEALTH 169 (2017) (“There is evidence that socioeconomic status (SES) affects individual’s [sic] health outcomes and the health care they receive. People of
lower SES are more likely to have worse self-reported health, lower life expectancy, and suffer from more chronic conditions when compared with those of
higher SES. They also receive fewer diagnostic tests and medications for
many chronic diseases and have limited access to health care due to cost and
coverage.”) (internal citations omitted).
388
389
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the activities? It can be argued that in a free society with free
markets, the wealthy can justifiably buy advantages less available
to others.396 This is easier to accept in regard, say, to purchasing
Rolls-Royce automobiles than to healthcare. Regarding physician
conflicts of interest, the idea is unsatisfying on two levels.
First, we are not talking about who can and cannot purchase luxury consumables; rather, we are talking about fundamental and basic safeguards in how people are provided with
medical treatment, which should be sound, safe, and effective for
everyone, not just for the wealthy.397 Second, to the extent that
there are racial or ethnic discrepancies in protection levels under a
disclosure model, we should rise to the challenge of affording the
same basic protections for all.398 In sum, disclosure as the means to
address these conflicts of interest is ineffectual and inadequate.
ii. Systemic Conditions Limit the Effectiveness of
Information and Disclosure as Means to Manage
Conflicts of Interest
Using disclosure to provide information to consumers, and
then expecting consumers to protect themselves, depends on consumers having real choice in the marketplace.399
See id. at 172.
This argument might follow a philosophy wherein “a political and legal
order should be maximally accountable to the representative occupants of the
most powerless positions defined by that order, consistent with the equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity principles.” Xavier Marquez, Maximizing Accountability to the Least Privileged: The Difference Principle, the Fair
Value of the Political Liberties, and the Design of Democratic Institutions, 47
POLITY 484, 484 (2015). For analysis of healthcare as a basic right, see generally Anita Pereira, Note and Comment, Live and Let Live: Healthcare is a
Fundamental Human Right, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 481 (2004).
398 See Aleksandra Jovic-Vranes et al., Education on Human Rights and
Healthcare: Evidence from Serbia, 30 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L 101 (2014)
(“Regardless of gender, age, race or socioeconomic background, we consider
our health to be our most important and essential asset. Increasing attention
has been paid to the right to the highest attainable standard of healthcare,
especially by human rights monitoring bodies, such as the World Health Organization and the Commission on Human Rights.”) (citation omitted).
399 See Serge-Christophe Kolm, On Real Economic Freedom, 35 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE. 351, 351–52 (2010) (observing that “possible choice” is a
component of actual freedom) (citation omitted).
396
397
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Choice of physician, however, is often constrained, and
therefore illusory, under managed health care.400 Many patients
cannot just choose the doctor they prefer.401 We depend on insurance coverage to pay for health care,402 and managed healthcare
has evolved to limit our free choice of physician.403 Participation
in a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) requires the use
of HMO doctors.404 Patients covered by Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) instead of HMOs are required by the plans
to use designated preferred provider physicians in order to get
the plan’s lower rates.405 While we might like the idea of avoiding regulation and ethics code constraints and leaving free
agents in free markets to make informed choices subject to disclosure of conflicts, free agency under managed healthcare is seriously constrained.406
The absence of choice for many in selecting a physician is
not the only aspect of managed health care that undermines our
ability to try to protect ourselves. It is exacerbated by a second
phenomenon: prescription plans contract favorable rates with
certain manufacturers, and they substitute a prescribing physician’s choice with a contractually favored, cheaper option.407 While
Goran Ridic et al., Comparisons of Health Care Systems in the United
States, Germany and Canada, 24 MATERIA SOCIO MEDICA 112, 119 (2012).
401 See id. at 116.
402 See, e.g., Amy Davidoff et al., The Effect of Parents’ Insurance Coverage
on Access to Care for Low-Income Children, 40 INQUIRY 254, 255 (2003) (“Parents’ insurance coverage ... may affect access to care for their children.”).
403 Ridic et al., supra note 400, at 119.
404 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., PHYSICIAN
PERSPECTIVES OF MEDICARE HMOS 1 (1998) (“Most HMOs operate on a gatekeeper system, in which a patient selects a primary care physician from a
group of approved plan providers to act as her or his first point of contact
within the health care system. This physician must authorize any specialist,
hospital, or other type of care the patient receives.”).
405 Ridic et al., supra note 400, at 116 (“PPOs are a third party payer that
offers financial incentives such as low out-of-pocket prices, to enrollees who
acquire medical care from a preset list of physicians and hospitals.”).
406 See id.
407 This process typically entails drug formularies, which list specific medications that an insurance plan will cover. Michael Ollove, New Rules Aim to
Keep Patients on Medications that Work, PEW TRUSTS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/02/new
-rules-aim-to-keep-patients-on-medications-that-work
[https://perma.cc/EUV9
400
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this practice does not itself directly concern conflicts of interest
that may cause doctors to sub-optimally treat or prescribe, it
does have ethical and policy implications of its own, and it compounds the fact that patients often have little control over the
quality of the treatments they will receive.408 It contributes to the
overall problem we are addressing here: that physicians uninfluenced by extraneous influences often are not the ultimate decisionmakers about a patient’s specific pharmaceutical treatment.409
The containment of health care costs is a pressing social
and economic concern, so these issues created by managed
healthcare are not created without some justification.410 On the
other hand, it is not clear that cost savings are actually passed
on to consumers, rather than simply retained by insurers and
pharmaceutical retailers as additional profit.411 As compelling as
-XYVS]. Formularies are sometimes changed abruptly, financially causing
patients to be put on alternative medications to those that may be working
well for them. Id. There has been some consumer protection movement to curtail
or restrict perceived formulary abuses, but formularies remain a reality for
many patients. Id.
408 While this secondary consideration does not trigger the prescribing doctor conflict of interest concerns that are the subject of this Article, it does exacerbate the current precariousness for patients hoping to receive the best
possible care. Recent Cases, First Amendment—Commercial Speech—Second
Circuit Holds That Prohibiting Truthful Off-Label Promotion of FDA-Approved
Drugs by Pharmaceutical Representatives Violates First Amendment.— United
States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), 127 HARV. L. REV. 795, 802 (2013)
(internal citations omitted). It adds an additional layer of risk and suboptimal drug selection, increasing the chances that a patient will get inferior rather than ideal treatment. Id. This dynamic adds to an overall environment
that reduces patient control and autonomy over treatment due to augmented
corporate prerogative in drug choices. See Hannah Fresques, Doctors Prescribe More of a Drug if They Receive Money from a Pharma Company Tied to
It, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2019, 12 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article
/doctors-prescribe-more-of-a-drug-if-they-receive-money-from-a-pharma-com
pany-tied-to-it [https://perma.cc/P5PF-V9NK]. In such an environment, disclosure protections are less convincingly adequate than regulatory restrictions.
409 See Ollove, supra note 407.
410 See Alfonso R. Oddo, Healthcare Ethics: A Patient-Centered Decision
Model, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 125, 125 (2001) (observing the tension between
high-quality healthcare and a need to keep costs contained).
411 See, e.g., Barak Richman et al., Mergers between health insurers and
pharmacy benefit managers could be bad for your health, STAT (June 1, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/06/01/mergers-health-insurers-pharmacy-ben
efit-managers/ [https://perma.cc/5FV5-NZC5].
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containment of healthcare costs is, patient safety and ensuring
basic integrity in the delivery of healthcare must ultimately be
our primary goals. Methods of controlling costs should not come
at the expense of patient safety.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Our analysis so far leads to two overarching observations.
First, conflict of interest is a serious problem affecting the ethically,
medically sound treatment of patients.412 Second, these issues
should be addressed by changes in the professional ethics codes of
both the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry.413
A. Conflict of Interest Is a Serious Problem Affecting the Ethically,
Medically Sound Treatment of Patients
Conflict of interest often creates untenable temptations
for doctors to alter their prescription patterns for reasons other
than the best interests of their patients.414 Survey research has
suggested that, “[d]espite the recent publicity about ethical problems in relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical
industry, ... physicians ... continue to have a rather permissive view
about a variety of marketing activities.”415
Consider the example of physicians treated to free travel
and expenses to attend symposia on a company’s new drugs.416
According to a recent article, “[e]ighty-five percent of [such] physicians interviewed stated that accepting such invitations would
not influence their use of the drugs. Nevertheless, their prescriptions for those drugs nearly tripled after the meetings, far
above increases in the use of those drugs nationally.”417 This
suggests that some physicians are unaware of unconscious biases that may affect their patient treatment decisions.418
Oddo, supra note 410.
PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2.
414 Aaron E. Carroll, Doctors’ Magical Thinking About Conflicts of Interest,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/upshot/doctors
-magical-thinking-about-conflicts-of-interest.html [https://perma.cc/F8A9-674P].
415 Brett et al., supra note 346, at 2217–18 (reflecting on data surveying
both experienced and inexperienced physicians at one institution).
416 Carroll, supra note 414.
417 Id.
418 Id.
412
413
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Other data confirm that self-serving temptations are related to patient treatment decisions.419 ProPublica, for example, has
found a connection between drug company payments/entertainment
and brand-name prescription levels:
Doctors who got money from drug and device makers prescribed a higher percentage of brand-name drugs overall than
doctors who didn’t .... Even those who simply got meals from
companies prescribed more brand-name drugs, on average.
Moreover, as payments increased, brand-name prescribing
rates tended to as well. Doctors who received more than
$5,000 from companies in 2014 typically had the highest
brand-name prescribing percentages. Among internists who
received no payments, for example, the average brand-name
prescribing rate was about 20 percent, compared to about 30
percent for those who received more than $5,000.420

Of course, such research identifies only correlation, not cauYet suspicion of causality is reasonable. Humans can be
self-serving, and alternative explanations are hard to fathom.422
The observed relationship between higher physician compensation
and higher prescription activity suggests a corrupt causality.423
There is another reason to suspect a causal relationship
between emolument and brand name prescription: the proliferation
of brand name prescribing associated with industry payments
thrives despite concerted professional efforts to decrease brand
name prescriptions in favor of more inexpensive generics.424 In
2015, the American College of Physicians called on doctors to
prescribe generic drugs rather than branded medications when
possible, in part to contain costs.425
sality.421

Charles Ornstein et al., Drug-Company Payments Mirror Doctors’
Brand-Name Prescribing, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/health-shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-company-payments-mirror
-doctors-brand-name-prescribing [https://perma.cc/GM2T-6EL9].
420 Id.
421 See id.
422 ANDREW M. KAMARCK, ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN APPROACH
TO NONAUTISTIC THEORY 22 (2002).
423 Ornstein et al., supra note 419.
424 Honor Whiteman, Doctors Should Prescribe Generic Drugs Over Branded Medications, Say Experts, MED. NEWS TODAY (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www
.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/303039.php [https://perma.cc/4QN8-HWX6].
425 Id.
419
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Cheaper generic drugs are in patients’ and the health care
system’s interest, as “[t]he majority of peer-reviewed studies [have]
found that generic equivalents to brand-name drugs produce
similar clinical outcomes ....”426 If generics are professionally considered preferable to branded drugs, it strains credulity to think
that the ProPublica study’s findings reflect anything but improperly subverted motives.427 There is a lack of convincing alternative explanations for why industry payments to doctors are
associated with increased brand-name prescribing.
Other data also suggest that pharmaceutical company payment to doctors corrupts prescription patterns.428 Direct evidence
links corporate benefit conferral to an increased prescription of
the benefactor’s products.429 Consider an analysis done jointly by
Harvard researchers and CNN, which examined Medicare Part D
prescription data, as well as pharmaceutical company payment data
obtained from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
from 2014–2015.430 CNN’s report noted the following findings:
Doctors were more likely to get paid by drug companies if
they prescribed a lot of opioids—and they were more likely to
get paid a lot of money. Among doctors in the top 25th percentile
of opioid prescribers by volume, 72% received payments. Among
those in the top fifth percentile, 84% received payments. Among
the very biggest prescribers—those in the top 10th of 1%—95%
received payments. On average, doctors whose opioid prescription
volume ranked among the top 5% nationally received twice as
much money from the opioid manufacturers, compared with
doctors whose prescription volume was in the median. Doctors
in the top 1% of opioid prescribers received on average four
times as much money as the typical doctor. Doctors in the top
10th of 1%, on average, received nine times more money than
the typical doctor.431
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The implications of this study are compelling. As with the
other correlational findings we have discussed here, the relationship could of course theoretically be coincidental, or caused
by variables other than corruption. Yet once again, if we try to
theorize alternative explanations, they strain belief. The probability of coincidence or alternative causality explanations across
all these studies decreases with each data set that essentially
finds the same basic phenomenon.432
We are left with two possibilities: drug companies reward
high prescribers with emoluments, or physicians become high
prescribers in hope of currying personal, profitable favor with
drug companies. Or both. Whichever might come first here, the
chicken or the egg, is really irrelevant, as the implied exchange
relationship is a loop of mutually desired give-and-take.433 Either
of these two explanations suggests an ethically unacceptable
quid pro quo that harms the public.434
B. The Issues Identified Should Be Addressed by Changes in the
Professional Ethics Codes of Both the Medical Profession and
the Pharmaceutical Industry
Both the American Medical Association and the Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America have addressed potential conflicts of interest among doctors and drug
companies.435 Sometimes these professional organizations have
created effective constraints and ethical restrictions, and sometimes they have left troubling practices in place.436
Our analysis has focused on two practices that continue to
raise conflict of interest challenges to law, public policy, and professional and industry ethics codes: subsidization of professional
Sarah Elizabeth Adler, Drug Firm Payments to Doctors Boost Prescription Spending, AARP (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/ad
vocacy/info-2020/drug-firm-payments-to-doctors-impact-consumers.html [https://
perma.cc/8ENF-D2QT].
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conferences and CME, and company-hosted speaker series. This
examination has suggested that subsidization of professional
conferences and CME under Former Opinion 8.061 of the AMA
Code passed muster and provided more value than peril,437 but
that the diluted protections in Current Opinion 9.2.7 are inadequate.438 If the AMA is to continue to condone industry involvement in these activities, it should revert to the former, more robust
standards that it eliminated in 2016.439 Otherwise, the conflict
of interest is not acceptably managed and should not be considered ethically defensible.
Company-hosted speaker series are a different matter,
and they simply do not pass serious ethical scrutiny. These programs create an unacceptable risk that treatment decisions may
be undermined by temptations of self-interest.440
We have seen that pharmaceutical speaker programs provide dubious social benefit while exacting substantial social costs.441
We also observed that current disclosure requirements are not
adequate to address these costs.442 If pharmaceutical company
speaker programs are untenable from the standpoints of ethics
and public policy, what can and should we do about them?
One approach might be to try to prohibit them by law.
Legislation and regulation both, however, open the door to potential First Amendment challenges.443 Arguably, there might
be defenses supporting the regulation of the speaker programs,
as they ostensibly would not attempt to prohibit companies from
speaking, but rather would restrict the time, place and manner
in which they speak.444
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See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48.
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In any event, professional and industry exercise of ethical
responsibility is preferable to externally imposed legal accountability. It is always preferable to avoid government regulation when
the public good can be achieved by voluntary self-restraint instead.445 AMA and PhRMA self-policing is a cleaner way to eliminate pharmaceutical company speaker programs. The AMA should
prohibit doctors from participating in them and the PhRMA
should prohibit companies from continuing to host them.
Self-interest may lead both physicians and pharmaceutical companies to seek less restrictive means of self-policing.446
They may look for ways to continue some version of company
speaker programs that arguably address the concerns raised
here. What that would look like is not immediately apparent,
given that the incentives for doctors to speak and companies to
host are likely to largely be self-interested ones.
It would therefore be a thorny challenge to save the general concept of company-hosted speaker series while sufficiently
addressing all the ethical concerns. Whatever the ultimate approach to these issues, it is time that healthcare professionals
and industry alike make a clear, unequivocal commitment to
placing the well-being of patients above personal and commercial advantage.

narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”)
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